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REGULATION BY AMICUS: THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S
POLICY MAKING IN THE COURTS
Deborah Thompson Eisenberg∗
Abstract
This Article examines the practice of “regulation by amicus”: that is, an
agency’s attempt to mold statutory interpretation and establish policy by
filing “friend of the court” briefs in private litigation. Since the United
States Supreme Court recognized agency amicus interpretations as a source
of controlling law entitled to deference in Auer v. Robbins, agencies have
used amicus curiae briefs—in strategic and at times aggressive ways—to
advance the political agenda of the President in the courts.
Using the lens of the U.S. Department of Labor’s amicus activity in
wage and hour cases, this Article explores the tension between the
extraordinary power and efficiency of agency amicus policy making on the
one hand, with the harms this less transparent approach may inflict on
fundamental democratic values such as public participation and separation
of powers.
The Article first puts the issue in empirical context by examining the
nature and impact of the DOL’s amicus filings in 324 Fair Labor Standards
Act cases from the Roosevelt through Obama administrations. To evaluate
the normative implications of amicus policy making, the piece then
juxtaposes the especially active amicus strategies employed by the Bush
administration—which manipulated deference principles to weaken worker
protection laws—and the Obama administration—which increased amicus
filings to revive enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act. This Article
proposes an analytical framework for judicial review of agency amicus
arguments that remains faithful to separation of powers—especially to the
legislative public policy established in remedial statutes like the FLSA.
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It would be a considerable paradox if before 2001 the
plaintiffs would win because the President was a Democrat,
between 2001 and 2009 the defendant would win because the
President was a Republican, and in 2012 the plaintiffs would
win because the President is again a Democrat. That would
make a travesty of the principle of deference to
interpretations of statutes by the agencies responsible for
enforcing them, since that principle is based on a belief either
that agencies have useful knowledge that can aid a court or
that they are delegates of Congress charged with interpreting
and applying their organic statutes consistently with
legislative purpose.1
INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the practice of “regulation by amicus”: that is, an
agency’s strategic attempt to mold the interpretation of the law and
establish policy through the filing of amicus curiae or “friend of the court”
briefs in private litigation. The amicus strategy provides a powerful tool by
which agencies may establish and change the law governing federal
statutes through binding judicial precedents.
Amicus briefs by the government can be helpful to courts and efficient
for the agency—providing “more bang for the buck” than traditional
agency enforcement actions and promoting uniform interpretation of the
law. But agencies can also improperly exploit amicus filings and
manipulate judicial deference doctrine to pursue political goals, sometimes
to the detriment of the statutory purpose with which Congress has
entrusted them. “Regulation by amicus” can, in some cases, undermine the
democratic values of accountability, transparency, public participation, and
reflective, reasoned decision making embodied in the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).2 The APA contemplates that agencies will carry out
their congressionally delegated mission primarily through formal
rulemaking3 or adjudication.4 The APA envisions that courts will serve as a
1. In this passage from Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 2012),
Judge Richard Posner criticized the Department of Labor’s “gyrating” interpretations during the
Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations about the compensability under the Fair Labor Standards
Act of the time workers spend donning and doffing protective clothing.
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006); see also Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers,
113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 697 (2000) (“Whatever the weaknesses of the American Administrative
Procedure Act—and they are serious—the statute recognizes that regulatory decisionmaking needs
special forms of legitimation that enhance popular participation, provide ongoing tests for
bureaucratic claims of knowledge, and encourage serious normative reflection upon the policy
choices inevitably concealed in abstract statutory guidelines.”).
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559. “[R]ule making” under the APA means “the agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.” Id. § 551(5). Rulemaking requires that the agency
provide an opportunity for public notice and comment on the proposed rule. Id. § 553(b)–(e).
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check on the agency’s actions, mandating that courts “shall decide all
relevant questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions.”5
As other scholars have noted, the APA’s reservation of legal questions
to the courts has been weakened by doctrine regarding judicial deference to
agency interpretations.6 Most notably, in Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,7 the U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed judicial
deference to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute
that Congress has charged it with implementing, particularly when that
interpretation is set forth in regulations developed through notice-andcomment rulemaking.8
Since Chevron, deference doctrine has reached far beyond rulemaking
to include informal agency interpretations and amicus arguments.
Specifically, in Auer v. Robbins,9 the Court extended controlling Chevron
deference to an agency’s informal interpretations of its own vague
regulations set forth—for the first time—in an amicus brief.10 As explored
in this Article, Auer led to a jubilee of agency amicus activity and court
confusion about the appropriate level of deference that should be given to
agency amicus positions, particularly when those positions advanced novel
theories, contradicted prior agency interpretations, or were not based on
rulemaking or other formal processes. Recently, in Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp.,11 the Court upheld Auer but limited its reach
to exclude cases in which when the agency’s amicus interpretation would
constitute “unfair surprise”12 to regulated entities or if “there is reason to
suspect that the agency’s interpretation ‘does not reflect the agency’s fair
and considered judgment on the matter in question.’”13
Because amicus filings lack the transparency and public participation of
rulemaking, the practice of “regulation by amicus” has occurred a bit under
4. “Adjudication” under the APA means the “agency process for the formulation of an
order.” Id. § 551(7). So, for example, hearings before the National Labor Relations Board would be
a form of “adjudication.”
5. Id. § 706.
6. One scholar has described the judicial review function under the APA as “a dead letter”
because of the Court’s common law deference frameworks. J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring
Deference to Variety with a Wink and a Nod to Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous
Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 89 (2010); see also
Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives
the Function of Agencies and Why it Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673 (2007).
7. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
8. Id. at 865–66.
9. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
10. See id. at 461 (holding that the DOL’s amicus interpretation of its own ambiguous
regulation was entitled to deference).
11. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
12. Id. at 2167.
13. Id. at 2166 (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462).
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the radar and has not been comprehensively analyzed by legal scholars.
Scholarship concerning the impact of amicus briefs generally, or
administrative deference doctrine more specifically, has focused on judicial
response. For example, legal scholars have examined how courts—
primarily the U.S. Supreme Court—have applied various doctrines of
administrative deference to agency interpretations, including those set forth
in amicus briefs.14 And political scientists have examined the impact of
amicus curiae filings by the Solicitor General on behalf of federal
administrative agencies in the Supreme Court.15
Little to no scholarly analysis has been focused in the opposite
direction; that is, on the affirmative use of amicus briefs by agencies—in
strategic and at times aggressive ways—to advance the President’s political
agenda in the courts. This Article begins to fill that gap, focusing on one
agency that has been especially active and masterful at using an amicus
approach to mold policy for the statutes with which Congress entrusted it
14. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1491–92 (2005) (finding that lower courts have generally waffled
on the issue of how and why to defer to agency interpretations); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren
E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) (analyzing U.S. Supreme Court
cases between 1984 and 2006 involving an agency’s interpretation of a statute and finding that
judicial ideology was a significant predictor of outcomes); Foote, supra note 6, at 722–23 (arguing
that Chevron’s premise that administrative actions are a type of statutory interpretation is flawed
and allows administrative procedures to displace statutes as a source of law); Kristin E. Hickman &
Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235
(2007) (discussing revitalization of Skidmore after United States v. Mead); Joseph D. Kearney &
Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 743, 828–30 (2000) (concluding that amicus briefs, especially those submitted by the Solicitor
General, have an impact on the Supreme Court); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 873–89 (2001) (proposing a “step zero” to Chevron analysis
in which the court would decide whether to analyze the issue under Chevron or Skidmore); Thomas
J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of
Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 870–71 (2006) (finding that application of Chevron framework is
greatly affected by the judges’ own ideological convictions); Connor N. Raso & William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates
Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1817 (2010) (concluding that
formal deference regimes do not predict votes, but justices are likely to vote according to
ideological influences).
15. See, e.g., PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (2008). Professor Collins conducted an empirical study of amicus briefs
submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court and found “strong support for the Solicitor General’s
influence in the Court.” Id. at 113. Specifically, “[w]hen the SG argues a liberal position, a justice is
13% more likely to cast a liberal vote; conversely, when the SG advocates for the conservative
position, the likelihood of observing a justice cast a conservative vote increases by 13%.” Id.; see
also Rebecca E. Deen et al., The Solicitor General as Amicus, 1953-2000: How Influential?, 87
JUDICATURE 60, 68 tbl.6 (2003) (finding that the Solicitor General was more successful as an
amicus than as a litigant, prevailing a high of 84.6% of the time during the Warren Court and a low
of 73.1% during the Rehnquist Court).
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to enforce: the U.S. Department of Labor. The DOL’s amicus activity in
cases involving the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)16 provides a unique
lens for analyzing how courts should treat agency amicus arguments. Many
of the leading agency deference cases—Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,17 Auer v.
Robbins,18 Christensen v. Harris County,19 Long Island Care at Home,
Ltd. v. Coke,20 and Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.21—involved
the DOL offering an interpretation of the FLSA—often for the first time—
in an amicus brief rather than through rulemaking or a direct enforcement
action.
In particular, the DOL under President George W. Bush—coming to
power on the heels of Auer—used deference doctrine as a sword to
emasculate worker protection statutes. For the first time in the agency’s
history, the Bush DOL affirmatively filed amicus briefs on behalf of
employers rather than employees to change the direction of FLSA policy.
The Bush DOL argued that positions articulated in its amicus briefs should
be afforded the highest level of deference under Chevron and Auer—even
where those arguments were inconsistent with long-standing prior agency
interpretations, were not based on formal rulemaking, and were announced
for the first time in the amicus brief or in an informal opinion letter issued
during the pending litigation.22
The amicus strategy gave the Bush administration a means to change
the law to benefit favored regulated interests without the public scrutiny
and compromises involved in promulgating formal regulations pursuant to
the APA. Indeed, the Bush DOL’s amicus efforts culminated in a
significant victory in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,23 in which a
unanimous Court deferred to the agency’s new, pro-employer interpretation
that home healthcare workers were not entitled to overtime—a position
that contradicted decades of prior DOL positions that these workers were
entitled to overtime under the FLSA. After Long Island Care at Home, the
DOL publicly touted amicus briefs as “a very powerful tool” to influence
how the Department’s regulations are interpreted by the courts.24
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).
17. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
18. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
19. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
20. 551 U.S. 158 (2007).
21. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (reviewing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d
383 (9th Cir. 2011)).
22. See infra Part II.F.1 for examples.
23. Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 171–74.
24. Michael R. Triplett, DOL Focus on Amicus Briefs, Opinion Letters Pays Off With
Increased Deference by Courts, 217 Daily Lab. Rep. Online (BNA) B-1 (Nov. 9, 2007) (reporting
comments by Paul L. Frieden, head of the appellate litigation department of the DOL Solicitor’s
Office at the American Bar Association’s Labor and Employment Section meeting on November 8,
2007).
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Although the Bush administration was especially adept at using amicus
briefs to accomplish its political aims of limiting the scope of the FLSA,
the Obama DOL used amicus briefs even more frequently to revive and
expand FLSA enforcement. In the four years of its first term, the Obama
DOL submitted more amicus briefs (forty-three) than the Bush DOL did in
eight years (twenty-three), partly to reverse certain pro-employer
interpretations of the Bush DOL.25 In some cases, the Obama DOL’s
attempts to restore FLSA policy to pre-Bush, pro-employee interpretations
have been rejected by courts, which have criticized the “gyrating” positions
of the DOL from the Clinton, to the Bush, to the Obama administrations.26
Although the Obama DOL so far has a lower success rate with its
amicus filings than the Bush DOL—with its amicus position prevailing in
56% of cases that have been decided as compared to the Bush DOL’s
amicus success rate of 74%—it has achieved significant victories on behalf
of workers. For example, in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
Corp.,27 the Supreme Court followed the DOL’s position that oral
complaints of wage violations are protected under the FLSA’s antiretaliation clause.28 It suffered a blow, however, in Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham, in which the Court upheld Auer’s principle of
deference for agency amicus interpretations so long as they do not to create
“unfair surprise” to regulated entities.29
The increasingly politically charged nature of both the agency’s amicus
efforts—as seen during the Bush and Obama administrations in
particular—and the ideological split in the Supreme Court’s decisions
about whether to defer to them portends a chaotic future for FLSA
litigation in the lower courts. But one thing is clear: the agency amicus
strategy can be a potent tool of policy making. While the Supreme Court
vacillates about the level of deference, if any, that should be applied to
amicus arguments, the empirical analysis in this Article shows that lower
25. See Jake Blumgart, The Long Fight for Labor: Why is Barack Obama Having Such a
Difficult Time Undoing Bush-era Damage to the Department of Labor?, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 9,
2010, http://prospect.org/article/long-fight-labor-0 (“George W. Bush staffed his Department of
Labor with rigidly pro-business ideologues who allowed the department’s investigative functions to
wither. Obama promised to end conservative influence over the department, freeing the career staff
to fulfill the agency’s core missions.”). Although employer groups did not complain about the Bush
administration’s aggressive amicus strategy that tended to favor employers, they have criticized the
Obama DOL for active amicus filings on behalf of employees. See News Release, HR Policy
Association to Scrutinize DOL Activity in the Courts on Wage and Hour Cases (Oct. 2, 2009),
http://www.hrpolicy.org/issues_story.aspx?gid=543&sid=3356&miid=8&msid=43 (“Well below
the radar, the Obama DOL is already seeking changes in the wage and hour laws by filing numerous
amicus briefs in the federal courts trying to reshape the laws in a more plaintiff-friendly manner.”).
26. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 2012).
27. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
28. Id. at 1336.
29. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp, 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012) (quoting and
citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158. 170–71 (2007)).
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courts have tended to rule consistently with DOL amicus positions, often
without identifying any particular deference regime or guiding interpretive
principles.
This Article shines a light on the phenomenon of regulation by amicus
to ensure that the integrity of the administrative enforcement process and
the core remedial intent of worker protection statutes are not lost in the
midst of the deference battles. Congress’s remedial purpose in passing the
FLSA guided judicial review of DOL amicus briefs until the age of Auer.
Although meant to promote uniformity of the law and efficiency for courts,
Auer has caused confusion and unintended consequences. In particular, the
Bush DOL used Auer and Chevron to undermine—rather than promote—
the FLSA’s goal of improving conditions for wage earners. The Obama
DOL zealously used amicus briefs to push FLSA enforcement so broadly
that it caused corporate and judicial backlash, as seen in Christopher. If
agency amicus activity is perceived to be guided by the ideology of the
political party in control of the White House—rather than the core remedial
intent of worker protection statutes—both the credibility of the DOL and
its effectiveness as an advocate on behalf of statutory beneficiaries of the
FLSA will be harmed.
Using the DOL’s amicus activity in FLSA cases, this Article explores
the tension between the extraordinary power and efficiency of agency
amicus briefs on the one hand with the harms amicus policy making may
inflict on bedrock democratic values such as transparency, public
participation, and separation of powers on the other. To be sure, having the
government as a “friend” to weigh in on difficult issues of statutory
interpretation can help to guide courts through the thicket of complex
regulatory schemes, such as the FLSA’s web of exemptions and broad
standards that must be applied to an ever-changing economy. If the DOL
exercises its amicus power in harmony with the remedial purpose of the
FLSA, the agency can be a critical, effective voice on behalf of the workers
who are protected by the FLSA. But amicus briefs and other informal
guidance also can be more easily, and stealthily, manipulated by regulated
interests to achieve political aims than traditional administrative processes
such as rulemaking. Given its greater malleability, amicus policy making
poses a higher risk of agency capture.30 Because amicus positions can flip30. “Agency capture” means the agency is unduly influenced by the industries that it is
charged with regulating. See David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 497 (1999) (“In ‘captured’ agencies, agency regulators do not
act as ‘arms-length’ representatives of some larger ‘public interest’ in their interaction with
regulated industries. Instead, government officials work to advance the agenda of current firms in
the industry by formulating regulations that benefit or at least do not substantially burden the
industry.”); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1565 (1992) (“According to the capture hypothesis, instead of providing
meaningful input into deliberation about the public interest, industry representatives co-opt
governmental regulatory power in order to satisfy their private desires.”).
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flop quickly with a change in administration, inconsistent agency amicus
positions may undermine the credibility of the DOL as a technical statutory
expert, to the detriment of the workers whom Congress sought to protect
with the FLSA.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides background
information about the DOL and the FLSA and analyzes the doctrinal
continuum of judicial deference to agency actions from Skidmore through
Christopher. The empirical analysis in Part II examines the nature and
impact of DOL amicus filings in 324 FLSA cases from the time the Act
was passed during the Roosevelt administration in 1938 through the end of
President Obama’s first term (ending December 31, 2012). This Part then
juxtaposes the DOL’s amicus activity under the Bush and Obama
administrations to highlight the benefits and harms of an amicus approach
to policy making.
Part III considers the normative implications of the agency amicus
strategy in the modern administrative state and proposes an analytical
framework for judicial review of agency amicus activity in the wake of
Auer and Christopher. The Article argues that deference should not apply
to amicus arguments where the agency’s interpretation conflicts with
Congress’s core remedial purpose in enacting worker protection statutes.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part provides background information about the DOL, the FLSA,
and the nature of the agency deference questions that arise in FLSA cases.
A. The Department of Labor and the FLSA
President William Howard Taft reluctantly added the DOL to the
presidential cabinet in 1913,31 after decades of lobbying for such a
department by labor unions and progressives.32 The DOL’s purpose was
“to foster, promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the
United States, to improve their working conditions, and to advance their
opportunities for profitable employment.”33
31. See Judson MacLaury, A Brief History: The U.S. Department of Labor (rev. ed. reprinted
from A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (George T. Kurian ed., 1998)), available at
http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/dolhistoxford.htm. President Taft signed the bill just
hours before President Wilson took office. President Taft’s signing memorandum indicated that he
signed the bill “with considerable hesitation,” not because he disagreed with the purpose but
because he thought that “nine departments [were] enough for the proper administration of the
government” and that a reorganization of departments was required. Memorandum from President
William Howard Taft, Memorandum to Accompany the Act to Create a Department of Labor, Mar.
4, 1913, available at http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/memo.htm.
32. See MacLaury, supra note 31 (“A Federal Department of Labor was the direct product of
a half-century campaign by organized labor for a ‘Voice in the Cabinet,’ and an indirect product of
the Progressive Movement.”).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 551.
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The FLSA is one of the most well-known and controversial34 laws
enforced by the DOL.35 President Franklin Roosevelt pushed for the FLSA,
a centerpiece of the New Deal, “to end starvation wages and intolerable
hours.”36 The legislation overcame several defeats in Congress37 and legal
challenges to its constitutionality.38 The FLSA aimed to overcome “labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers.”39 The FLSA mandates a minimum wage and overtime pay for
certain workers and prohibits certain types of child labor.40 With limited
exceptions, most employers in the United States are now covered by the
FLSA.41
Within the DOL, the FLSA is enforced by the Wage and Hour Division,
led by an Administrator who is appointed by the President and approved by
the Senate.42 The Administrator is authorized to investigate and gather
wage data, conduct employer compliance audits, and sue employers for
violations.43 The FLSA also authorizes the Secretary of Labor to “define
34. Business groups have claimed that the FLSA “is an ‘anachronism’ that has become a ‘job
killer’” while employee advocates caution “that broadening exemptions from the act’s minimum
wage and overtime protections could result in a ‘race to the bottom’ against foreign competitors that
would ultimately not serve American employers or U.S. workers.” Lawrence E. Dubé, Business
Groups, Lawyer Urge FLSA Review, Telling House Panel Legislation is Outdated, 135 Daily Lab.
Rep. Online (BNA) A-11 (July 14, 2011) (reporting on testimony before the Workforce Protections
Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Education and Workforce Committee). For differing
perspectives on the FLSA, see The Fair Labor Standards Act: Is it Meeting the Needs of the
Twenty-First Century Workplace?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the
H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 112th Cong. (2011).
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).
36. FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, Annual Message to the Congress, 1938 PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 6 (Samuel I. Rosenman comp., 1941).
37. See Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a
Minimum Wage (rev. ed. reprinted from MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1978), http://www.dol.gov/
oasam/programs/history/flsa1938.htm. For historical descriptions of the FLSA, see John S.
Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 464–
73 (1939), and Scott D. Miller, Revitalizing the FLSA, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 7–25 (2001)
(examining historical origins of “short hours movements” that led to the FLSA’s passage).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding constitutionality of the
FLSA).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006).
40. Id. § 206 (minimum wage); id. § 207 (overtime), id. § 212 (child labor).
41. There are two ways in which an employee can be covered by the FLSA. First, the FLSA
applies to any “enterprises” that employ at least two employees and that have an annual dollar
volume of sales or business done of at least $500,000. Id. § 203(s)(1)(A). Hospitals, institutions
providing medical or nursing care for residents, schools, and preschools, and public agencies are
also covered. Id. § 203(r)(2). Second, individual employees are protected if they are “engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” Id. §§ 206(a)(1), 207(a)(1). Even if these
general coverage provisions are satisfied, the FLSA contains pages of exemptions. Id. § 213.
42. Id. § 204(a).
43. Id. § 211 (concerning data collection); id. § 216(c) (establishing the powers to audit and
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and delimit” exemptions from the minimum wage and maximum hour
requirements.44
Any government enforcement of the FLSA and other worker protection
statutes is litigated by the DOL’s Office of the Solicitor.”45 The Solicitor of
Labor (SOL) is the DOL’s “third highest ranking official and its chief legal
officer.”46 Like the Wage and Hour Administrator, the Solicitor is also a
political appointee. “All SOL attorneys report to the Solicitor, rather than
to client program agency heads, as is the practice in many executive branch
departments.”47 Consequently, the Solicitor has unique independence and
power in enforcing the policy priorities of the President under whom he or
she serves.48
The basic provisions of the FLSA seem simple on their face: employers
must pay covered workers at least the minimum wage (originally twentyfive cents and now $7.25 per hour)49 and pay them “not less than one and
one-half times” their regular hourly rate for every hour after forty hours
worked in a week.50 In practice, however, these mandates are complicated
by a complex web of exceptions to the general rules.51 Two recurring
issues appear in FLSA case law: (1) whether the plaintiffs are exempt from
the Act’s requirements and (2) whether certain tasks performed by the
employee count as “hours worked” for purposes of minimum wage and
overtime computations.
Unlike some statutes, which use an administrative process to determine
whether a particular situation falls under the law,52 Congress designed the
FLSA to be enforced in the courts in two ways. First, the Secretary of
Labor may file a direct enforcement action in which the DOL is the
plaintiff.53 In this scenario, the DOL, like any other plaintiff, would bear
the burden of proving that the employer violated the statute. Second,
to sue).
44. Id. § 213(a)(1), (a)(15). The Secretary’s FLSA regulations are found at 29 C.F.R. §§ 510–
794.
45. OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WORKING FOR AMERICA’S WORKFORCE 2,
available at http://www.dol.gov/sol/media/brochure/sol.pdf (last visited June 12, 2013).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (2006).
50. Id. § 207(a)(1).
51. To provide a few examples, farmworkers, employees of a “motion picture theater,”
“domestic service” workers, and various processing workers in the seafood and maple sap industries
are all exempt from FLSA overtime requirements. See, e.g., id. §§ 213(a)(5), (a)(15), (b)(15),
(b)(21), (b)(27).
52. For example, the DOL adjudicates claims for benefits under various disability
compensation programs for various workers, such as the Federal Black Lung Program for coal
miners, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901–945 (2006), and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Program, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (2006).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2006).
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because the DOL lacks the resources to enforce all wage and hour
violations, Congress allowed employees to sue as “private attorneys
general,” with the right to recover double liquidated damages and
attorneys’ fees from the employer if they prevail.54 Whether the case is
filed by the DOL directly, or by employees on their own behalf, courts
have the ultimate responsibility to resolve legal issues under the Act. As
the Supreme Court explained in one of the earliest FLSA cases,
Kirschbaum v. Walling,55 “the [FLSA] puts upon the courts the
independent responsibility of applying ad hoc the general terms of the
statute to an infinite variety of complicated industrial situations.”56
Given the nature of these questions, FLSA cases often involve intricate
examination of the statutory text, the Act’s legislative history and
implementing regulations, and a variety of informal interpretive materials
developed by the DOL. The most commonly reviewed documents in FLSA
cases include opinion letters, interpretive bulletins, advisory memoranda,
field enforcement guides written for wage and hour investigators and, of
course, agency amicus briefs.
The interpretive issues in FLSA cases, and the power of the courts to
ultimately resolve them, offer a rich study of how federal courts have
addressed the question of how much deference to grant to the agency’s
regulations, to informal guidance developed without formal rulemaking,
and to the agency’s positions in amicus briefs. The next section describes
the agency deference frameworks most frequently invoked in FLSA
jurisprudence.
B. Continuum of Agency Deference Regimes
Administrative law scholars have recognized that “the Supreme Court’s
deference jurisprudence is a mess.”57 This section attempts to make sense
of relevant administrative deference case law to lay a foundation for the
analysis that follows.
The application of broad statutory language to precise factual situations
often gives rise to ambiguity. The Court has attempted to define deference
principles for agency interpretations of the meaning or application of vague
statutes or regulations. The level of deference to agency interpretations has
been described as a continuum ranging from “persuasive weight” under
54. Id. § 216(b).
55. 316 U.S. 517 (1942) (holding landlords’ employees covered under the FLSA).
56. Id. at 523.
57. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 14, at 1157; see also Goering, supra note 6, at 22
(describing deference case law as “mish-mash of a muddled mess”); Ann Graham, Searching for
Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of Agency Regulations, 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 229, 262 (2008) (referring to “a confusing muddle of decisions which turn on
internecine disputes, back-filling from the desired result, and flavor-of-the-week analytical
models”).
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Skidmore to binding deference under Chevron.58
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., one of the first deference cases, continues to
figure prominently in modern administrative law.59 In Skidmore, seven
employees at a packing plant sued their employer under the FLSA arguing
that the time the employer required them to be “on call” constituted hours
worked for overtime purposes.60 The Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division submitted an amicus brief,61 arguing that all of the time that the
workers spent on duty, including waiting time, constituted compensable
time under the FLSA.62
The Court noted the fact-intensive nature of the question presented and
emphasized the Court’s duty to determine the application of the law.63 The
Court explained that in the FLSA, “Congress did not utilize the services of
an administrative agency to find facts and to determine in the first instance
whether particular cases fall within or without the Act. Instead, it put this
responsibility on the courts.”64 But, the Court noted, Congress created the
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division and “put on him the duties
of bringing injunction actions to restrain violations.”65 To carry out this
enforcement function, the Administrator developed “an interpretative
bulletin” and informal rulings that “provide[d] a practical guide to
employers and employees as to how the office representing the public
interest in its enforcement will seek to apply it.”66
In its amicus brief in Skidmore, the agency described the prior
Interpretative Bulletin that set forth general standards and examples
designed to guide the determination of the compensability of waiting time.
Although none of the examples in the Bulletin dealt specifically with the
type of employees involved in Skidmore, the Administrator’s amicus brief
applied the Bulletin to the factual scenario at issue and concluded that all
on-call time was compensable except for sleeping and eating time.
The Court stated that the agency’s interpretation, although not reached
by trial in an adversary form, was nevertheless entitled to respect. The oftquoted passage from Skidmore provided that the agency’s enforcement
experience and informed judgment may provide helpful guidance to courts
and litigants:

58. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 14.
59. See, e.g., Hickman & Krueger, supra note 14, at 1236.
60. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 135–36 (1944).
61. The DOL is represented by the U.S. Solicitor General in the U.S. Supreme Court.
62. Brief of the Adm’r of the Wage and Hour Div. as Amicus Curiae, Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (No. 12), 1944 WL 42828.
63. 323 U.S. at 136–37 (“Whether in a concrete case such [waiting] time falls within or
without the Act is a question of fact to be resolved by appropriate findings of the trial court.”).
64. Id. at 137.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 138.

1236

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of
the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon
the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of
such a judgment in a particular case will depend on the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.67
Skidmore recognized that context matters. That context includes the
underlying remedial purpose of the statute, the agency’s enforcement role
pursuant to that statute, the circumstances that led to the agency guidance,
and the consistency and integrity of the agency’s interpretation vis-à-vis the
remedial purpose of the law. The agency, in this sense, is akin to an expert
witness providing an additional factual data point to the court,68 with the
court ultimately responsible for interpreting and enforcing legislative will.
Contrast Skidmore with Chevron.69 Chevron resulted from a battle
between environmental groups and various industries over the definition of
“stationary sources” of air pollution under the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1977.70 The Clean Air Act capped emissions levels from “stationary
sources” but did not define the term.71 After notice-and-comment
rulemaking and intense lobbying efforts from stakeholders, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) decided “to allow States to treat
all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as
though they were encased within a single ‘bubble’ . . . .”72 The Natural
Resources Defense Council challenged the new regulation.73
In Chevron, a unanimous Court74 upheld the regulation as a reasonable
construction of the statute and announced the famous two-step agency
deference framework. Under step one, the court should determine whether
Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”75 If so, the
court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of

67. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
68. See Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 997, 1042 (2007) (arguing that Skidmore “should be read as requiring courts to take agency
views into account as a relevant data point when independently construing statutory ambiguity”).
69. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
70. Id. at 839–40.
71. See id. at 866.
72. Id. at 840.
73. Id. at 837.
74. Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and O’Connor did not participate in the decision. Id. at 866.
75. Id. at 842.
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Congress.”76 Under step two, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”77
The Court found that the EPA’s new stationary source rule “represent[ed]
a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and [was]
entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme [was] technical and complex,
the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and
the decision involve[d] reconciling conflicting policies.”78
As in Skidmore, the Court expressed respect for the experience and
expertise of the agency charged with administering the statute. But unlike
the Court in Skidmore, which emphasized the judiciary’s responsibility to
be the ultimate interpreter of a statute’s purpose and scope, the Chevron
Court urged deference to the agency’s policy choices, at least those made
via a rulemaking process, because of the greater political accountability of
the executive branch. The Court advised that if the agency has resolved
competing views of the public interest in a reasonable way, “federal
judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate
policy choices made by those who do.”79
In Auer v. Robbins,80 the Court extended Chevron deference far beyond
rulemaking to informal agency interpretations in amicus briefs. Auer was
filed by police sergeants seeking overtime wages under the FLSA.81 The
police department claimed that the officers were exempt as “bona fide
executive, administrative, or professional” employees.82 The officers
contended that the employer lost the exemption because the personnel
manual permitted pay deductions for disciplinary infractions, even though
no deductions were actually made.83 In its amicus brief, filed at the Court’s
request, the DOL explained that the employer may lose the administrative
exemption when employers make actual deductions from pay, but not
when there is only a theoretical possibility of such deductions.84 Applying
this rule, the DOL agreed that the employer did not lose the benefit of the
exemption and that the officers were not entitled to overtime.
76. Id. at 842–43.
77. Id. at 843.
78. Id. at 865.
79. Id. at 866. See also Eskridge & Baer, supra note 14, at 1085 (explaining Chevron);
Merrill & Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, supra note 14, at 853–56 (comparing the Skidmore and
Chevron doctrines).
80. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
81. Id. at 455.
82. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy this
exemption, the employer bears the burden of satisfying two tests: (1) the employee must be paid on
a salaried, rather than hourly, basis; and (2) the employee must perform duties that show sufficient
degrees of discretion and managerial functions.
83. Auer, 519 U.S. at 455.
84. Id. at 461.
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Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court in Auer, invoked
Chevron to defer to the agency’s amicus interpretation. The Court
explained that the fact that the Secretary’s interpretation came in the form
of an amicus curiae brief did not make it unworthy of deference.85 The
Court found that the agency’s position was not a litigation position or
“‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency seeking to defend past
agency action against attack” and that there was “simply no reason to
suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and
considered judgment on the matter in question.”86
Under Auer, an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous
regulations is binding and entitled to deference unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.87 Some scholars have argued
that Auer affords a type of “super-deference” even greater than Chevron
and have advocated for its reversal.88 Auer effectively enshrined an
agency’s amicus arguments as controlling law. As one scholar wrote:
“What set Auer apart was that it granted super-deference to an informal
agency interpretation expressed in an amicus brief that the Court had
specifically requested.”89
Upon examination of the DOL’s actual amicus arguments in Auer, it is
unclear what all of the deference fuss was really about: the Court could
have reached the same result if it simply had applied Skidmore. The DOL
did the same thing in its Auer amicus brief as it had done in Skidmore:
describe and apply the applicable law and existing agency guidance to the
factual scenario before the Court. Indeed, the DOL had urged the Supreme
Court not to grant certiorari in Auer because the issue involved was so factbound and the governing law settled.90 In its amicus brief, the agency did
85. Id. at 462 (“Petitioners complain that the Secretary's interpretation comes to us in the
form of a legal brief; but that does not, in the circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of
deference.”).
86. Id. at 462 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988))
(alteration in original).
87. Auer deference has been compared to an earlier case, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), which was decided on the heels of Skidmore. In Seminole Rock, the
Office of Price Administration filed suit to enjoin a manufacturer of crushed stone from violating
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and its implementing regulations. Seminole Rock, 325
U.S. at 412. The Court deferred to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, which it
characterized as having “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.” Id. at 414.
88. See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 14, at 1184 (urging Court to abrogate Seminole
Rock); Goering, supra note 6, at 50 (arguing that Auer “‘super deference’ . . . cannot be reconciled
with Chevron’s ‘two-step’ approach” and has, in effect, “abdicate[d] judicial responsibility for
resolving ambiguities”); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 614–16 (1996) (criticizing
Seminole Rock).
89. Goering, supra note 6, at 49.
90. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7–8,
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not argue for any novel legal interpretation or request Chevron-like
deference. The agency’s views were persuasive because the interpretation
was venerable and established long before the case. Even though the Court
did not need to reach for a new “super deference” standard, Justice Scalia
proclaimed that the agency’s amicus views should be afforded the highest
level of deference under Chevron.
Three years after Auer, a divided Court seemed to reverse course on the
degree of deference to give to an informal agency interpretation in
Christensen v. Harris County.91 In a split decision, the Court refused to
defer to a DOL position in an opinion letter and amicus brief that the FLSA
prohibited state employers from compelling employees to use accrued
compensatory time in the absence of a prior agreement or understanding
authorizing compelled use.92 The Court held that “[i]nterpretations such as
those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack
the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”93 Justice
Clarence Thomas, for the majority, wrote: “To defer to the agency’s
position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a
regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.”94After “a doctrinal tug of
war within the Supreme Court” about the scope of Chevron and continuing
viability of Skidmore,95 the Court attempted to reconcile Skidmore and
Chevron in United States v. Mead Corp.96 The Mead Court held that a
letter ruling by the Customs Service regarding the characterization of an
import item for tariff purposes was not entitled to Chevron deference, but
may be entitled to respect under Skidmore.97 The Court clarified that
“administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies
for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise
of that authority.”98 The Court also confirmed the continuing vitality of
Skidmore—which had been in some doubt99—instructing that it should be
Auer v. Robbins, 419 U.S. 452 (No. 95-897), 1996 WL 33414029.
91. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
92. Id. at 588.
93. Id. at 587.
94. Id. at 588. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, agreeing that the DOL’s position did
not seem to be a reasonable interpretation of the statute, but arguing that the DOL’s amicus brief,
standing alone, and opinion letter were entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at 591 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
95. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 14, at 1088.
96. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
97. Id. at 221.
98. Id. at 226–27.
99. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 14, at 1243 (2007) (describing debate about
Skidmore’s viability after Chevron).
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used when such delegated lawmaking authority does not exist. Mead did
not, however, overrule Auer.
After Christensen and Mead, the Court swung back again to Auer-like
deference for informal agency interpretations in Long Island Care at Home
Ltd. v. Coke.100 Long Island Care at Home went even farther than Auer.
Whereas Auer involved the application of a well-established agency
position to a new factual scenario, Long Island Care at Home deferred to
the DOL’s change in policy during pending litigation, expressed for the
first time in an amicus brief and informal agency guidance, to support a
litigant who had lost in the trial court—and a regulated entity to boot.101
In this case, the Bush administration argued—contrary to prior
longstanding DOL positions—that in-home companionship workers who
work for home healthcare companies were exempt from overtime.102 It did
not bother the Court that the DOL’s interpretation “had sometimes been
circuitous and inconsistent”103 or that the agency’s new interpretation was
set forth in an informal Advisory Memorandum prepared in response to a
court defeat for the employer. Citing Auer, the Court found that the change
in interpretation did not provide reason to disregard the DOL’s new
position and that the agency’s position was entitled to deference so long as
it did not create “unfair surprise.”104
During the Obama administration, the Court shifted back to reliance on
Skidmore and Mead to defer to the DOL’s amicus position in Kasten v.
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.105 Specifically, the Court gave
“a degree of weight” to the DOL’s view that the FLSA anti-retaliation
provision covered employees who made internal oral complaints about
wage violations to employers.106 Some circuits had found that only written
wage complaints filed with the agency or in court constituted activity
immune from retaliation.107 The Court found the DOL’s amicus position
reasonable because the agency had held the position since at least 1961 and
had reaffirmed that interpretation numerous times in subsequent amicus
filings.108 The Court concluded that the “length of time” the DOL held the
view “reflect[ed] careful consideration” and “add[ed] force” to the Court’s
100. 551 U.S. 158 (2007).
101. See id. at 174.
102. Id. at 161–62.
103. See Michael R. Triplett, Justices Rule 9-0 that Home Health Workers Employed by Third
Parties Not Owed Overtime, 112 Daily Lab. Rep. Online (BNA) AA-1 (June 12, 2007).
104. Long Island Care at Home at 170. The Article returns to the backstory behind the Long
Island Care at Home case in Part II.F.
105. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
106. Id. at 1335.
107. See, e.g., Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993), abrogated by Kasten v.
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (holding anti-retaliation
protection did not cover oral complaints).
108. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1335.
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conclusion that oral complaints were protected.109
These competing deference doctrines from Auer/Long Island Care at
Home on the one hand and Mead/Christensen on the other came to a head
in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp..110 The case concerned
whether pharmaceutical representatives fell within the “outside sales”
exemption of the FLSA.111 In 2009, the DOL began to file amicus briefs in
private litigation arguing that pharmaceutical detailers—who promote
pharmaceutical products to physicians but are prohibited by law from
selling them to doctors—are not exempt from overtime because they do
not “sell” as that term is defined in the outside sales exemption.112 The
Second Circuit had deferred to the DOL’s interpretation set forth in an
amicus brief.113 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit criticized the DOL for using
its “appearance as amicus to draft a new interpretation of the FLSA’s
language.”114
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously found that the DOL’s amicus
position in Christopher was not entitled to deference.115 Although the DOL
had not changed its position that pharmaceutical detailers were entitled to
overtime because they did not satisfy the definition of the outside sales
exemption, the Court refused to defer because the agency’s reasoning—
that is, the legal argument in its brief—about why detailers were covered
by the Act had changed in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court as
compared to its briefs in the circuit courts below.116 This is perplexing
given the Court’s unanimous deference to an agency’s complete aboutface—from a pro-employee to pro-industry position during pending
litigation—in Long Island Care at Home.
The conservative majority117 in Christopher went one step further to
add a surprising gloss to Auer deference that elevated the concerns of
regulated businesses over that of statutory beneficiaries. Although wellestablished FLSA precedent dictates that the Act must be interpreted
liberally to effectuate Congress’s remedial purpose,118 and that any
exemptions from the law should be narrowly construed against the
employer,119 the majority’s dicta turned these principles on their head. The
109. Id.
110. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
111. Id. at 2161.
112. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (2006).
113. See In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 153 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011), abrogated by Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156
(2012).
114. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 395 (9th Cir. 2011).
115. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2168–69.
116. Id. at 2169–70.
117. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
118. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 296 (1985).
119. See, e.g., Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960).
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Court expressed concern that the pharmaceutical company would be
exposed to “potentially massive liability” if required to pay overtime.120
The Court noted that the DOL had never instituted an enforcement action
against the employer and announced its position that pharmaceutical
detailers were not exempt for the first time in an amicus brief.121 The
majority concluded: “To defer to the agency’s interpretation in this
circumstance would seriously undermine the principle that agencies should
provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a regulation]
prohibits or requires.’”122 No deference is warranted, the Court said, if it
would constitute “unfair surprise” to employers.123 Justice Alito dropped a
vague footnote stating that the longstanding principle that exemptions must
be narrowly construed against employers was “inapposite where, as here,
we are interpreting a general definition that applies throughout the
FLSA.”124
The Court’s approach to deference doctrine from Auer to Christopher
reflects an ideological, results-oriented approach. While the conservative
justices have strongly deferred to the DOL’s position when it has favored
employers—as in Auer and Long Island Care at Home—they have refused
to defer to DOL positions that have favored workers, as in Christopher and
Christensen.125 With the exception of Christopher, the liberal-leaning
justices have deferred to the DOL in all cases, even those in which the
agency interpretation favored business. Although the liberal justices did
not defer to the DOL’s interpretation in Christopher, they ruled
consistently with the DOL’s position that the employees were entitled to
overtime—finding that pharmaceutical detailers did not meet the test for
the outside sales exemption because they were prohibited by law from
actually conducting any sales.
Christopher adds a spin on deference doctrine that may be especially
worrisome for the DOL’s future efforts to enforce worker protection
statutes. In short, the Court’s latest ruling sets up a regime in which the
agency may advance amicus arguments that withdraw FLSA protection for
120. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2167.
121. Id. at 2168.
122. Id. at 2167 (quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n,
790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
123. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id. at 2171 n.21.
125. Id. The majority in Christensen included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter. Christensen v, Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 577 (2000).
Justice Scalia concurred, arguing that agency positions, even in opinion letters and amicus briefs,
should be afforded Chevron deference, but found, without explanation, that the DOL’s position was
nevertheless “unreasonable.” Id. at 589–91. The dissent included Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
both Clinton appointees, plus Justice Stevens, a Ford appointee who ruled more consistently with
Democratically appointed justices over time. An exception is Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance
Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011), in which the only dissenters were Justices Scalia and
Thomas. Id. at 1336.
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workers and interpret the law to favor the regulated—as was the case in
Long Island Care at Home. But agency efforts to advance arguments on
behalf of workers might be rejected if regulated entities are subjected to
“unfair surprise” by an amicus brief supporting liability. Because the DOL
is such an active litigant and amicus curiae, lower federal courts will
undoubtedly be sorting through how Christopher fits into deference
doctrine. The Article returns to this question in Part III to help guide courts
through that task.
The next Part puts the recent explosion of agency amicus activity in
empirical context by tracing the extraordinary, albeit often hidden, impact
that DOL amicus arguments have had in shaping FLSA policy.
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DOL AMICUS ACTIVITY IN FLSA CASES
FROM ROOSEVELT TO OBAMA
A. Methodology
The dataset for the empirical analysis consisted of all DOL amicus
curiae briefs in FLSA cases since its passage in 1938 through December
31, 2012. Briefs were identified and obtained from multiple sources. First,
most of the amicus briefs for the Bush and Obama administration were
obtained from the website of the DOL’s Office of Solicitor.126 Second,
searches were conducted in Westlaw and LEXIS to find any cases in which
the U.S. Department of Labor, the Secretary of Labor, or the Administrator
of the Wage and Hour Division were identified as amicus curiae. Third,
briefs not available on public electronic databases were obtained from the
DOL through a Freedom of Information Act request or reviewed at the
DOL law library.127 Many of the older briefs were in such poor condition
that they were reviewed and indexed at the DOL library.
All amicus briefs and the corresponding cases in which they were filed
were reviewed and coded based on twenty-five variables.128 The resulting
126. See SOL Briefs, U.S. DEPT’ OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/sol/media/briefs/main.htm (last
visited Mar. 14, 2012).
127. A FOIA request to the Bush DOL went completely unanswered. Letter to Paul DeCamp,
U.S. Dep’t of Labor Employment Standards Div. (Nov. 13, 2008) (on file with author). The Obama
administration responded to updated FOIA request. The DOL does not maintain a centralized
collection of all amicus curiae briefs it has filed. The DOL Wirtz Labor Law Library had some
older amicus briefs that had been donated by the Solicitor of Labor’s office at some point, but the
collection is incomplete. Starting with the administration of George W. Bush, most, but not all, of
the DOL’s amicus curiae briefs have been posted on the agency’s website.
128. These variables are: (1) case name and citation; (2) year of the court decision; (3) the
court in which the brief was filed; (4) the author of the majority opinion; (5) the President who
appointed the author of the opinion (if a federal judge); (6) the author of any dissenting opinion;
(7) the President who appointed the dissenting judge; (8) whether the dissenting opinion discussed
the appropriate level of deference; (9) the counsel for the employee(s); (10) counsel for the
employer; (11) the level at which the DOL became involved as an amicus in the case (district court,
court of appeals, U.S. Supreme Court, or state court); (12) the holding in the case; (13) whether the
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database consisted of 324 FLSA cases, which are listed by presidential
administration in the Appendix.129
It is possible that some cases in which the DOL filed FLSA amicus
briefs, especially prior to the Reagan administration, were not identified,
but there is no indication from case research or from the DOL that there are
more briefs. The DOL reported in response to my FOIA request that it may
have discarded some old briefs during office moves. There are twenty-two
cases for which case research indicated that the DOL filed an amicus brief
in the case but the agency’s brief is no longer available.130 For the cases for
which the DOL’s amicus briefs are no longer available, the judicial
opinions alone were analyzed. The database of briefs from the Clinton,
Bush, and Obama administrations—which were the first to advance
deference arguments consistently and form the core of this Article’s
analysis—are believed to be complete.
B. Overview of DOL Amicus Activity from Roosevelt to Obama
Some scholars have observed that the submission of amicus briefs, by
the government and by private groups, has skyrocketed in recent years.131
decision was consistent with the DOL’s amicus position, regardless of whether the amicus brief or
deference principles were discussed; (14) which party prevailed (employer or employee); (15) the
level of deference, if any, that the DOL argued in its brief; (16) the deference case(s) or principle(s)
cited or discussed in the court’s opinion; (17) the type of agency interpretation for which the DOL
requested deference (e.g., regulation, opinion letter or other informal agency guidance, amicus
argument); (18) summary of the DOL’s argument in its amicus brief; (19) the President who was in
office at the time the DOL filed the brief; (20) the President who was in office at the time the court
ruled in the case; (21) the statute under which the plaintiff sued (all FLSA); (22) whether the DOL
requested deference for an opinion letter(s); (23) the date that any opinion letter(s) for which the
DOL requested deference was issued; (24) whether the court requested DOL amicus participation;
and (25) whether the court asked the DOL for supplemental amicus briefing.
129. See infra Appendix.
130. The cases for which the DOL’s amicus briefs are no longer available include: Alewine v.
City Council of Augusta, 699 F.2d 1060 (11th Cir. 1983); Weisel v. Singapore Joint Venture, Inc.,
602 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1979); Williams v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 477 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1973);
Asker v. Stephens, 394 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1968); Childress v. Earl Whitley Enters., Inc., 388 F.2d
742 (4th Cir. 1968); Cont’l/Moss-Gordin, Inc. v. Harp, 386 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1967); Allen v. Atl.
Realty Co., 384 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1967); Rachal v. Allen, 321 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1963); Norman v.
Moseley, 313 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1963); Goldstein v. Dabanian, 291 F.2d 208 (3d Cir. 1961);
Caserta v. Home Lines Agency, Inc., 273 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1959); Crook v. Bryant, 265 F.2d 541
(4th Cir. 1959); Sams v. Beckworth, 261 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1958); Mateo v. Auto Rental Co., 240
F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1957); Thomason v. Alester G. Furman Co., 222 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1955); E.I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Harrup, 227 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1955); Clougherty v. James Vernor
Co., 187 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1951); United States Cartridge Co. v. Powell, 185 F.2d 67 (8th Cir.
1950); Grant v. Bergdorf & Goodman Co., 172 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1949); Brenna v. Federal
Cartridge Corp., 174 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1949); Chapman v. Home Ice Co., 136 F.2d 353 (6th Cir.
1943); Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ala. 1980); Peterson
v. McDonald, 73 F. Supp. 840 (D. Minn. 1947); Belanger v. Hopeman Bros., Inc., 6 F.R.D. 459 (D.
Me. 1947); Brewer v. Cent. Greenhouse Corp., 352 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1961).
131. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 14, at 754 (noting increase in the mean number of
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That is not true for the DOL’s amicus activity, which was at its peak during
the New Deal, although the nature of the activity has changed dramatically
over time. Overall DOL amicus activity in FLSA cases by presidential
administration is reflected in Table1:
Table 1: DOL Amicus Activity in FLSA Cases by Administration
(through December 31, 2012)
President at Time of Filing
Roosevelt
Truman
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter
Reagan
Bush I
Clinton
Bush
Obama
Total FLSA Amicus Briefs

Number of Amicus
Briefs Filed
96
74
19
3
9
14
3
7
7
4
22
23
43
324

The most active DOL amicus curiae activity in FLSA cases occurred
immediately after the Act’s passage. After the battle to achieve passage of
the FLSA, the Roosevelt and Truman administrations used amicus briefs to
establish judicial precedents broadly construing the scope of the FLSA’s
protections.132 Indeed, more than half of all FLSA amicus briefs in the
database (170 out of 324 briefs) were filed by these two administrations.
Many of these early DOL amicus efforts, such as Skidmore, remain
important precedents in employment and administrative law. Most of the
cases involved questions about the FLSA’s scope and fell into three basic
categories: first, briefs arguing that the employees in question were
engaged in “interstate commerce” and therefore covered by the Act;133
amicus briefs per case from about 0.50 in the late 1940s to 4.23 in the 1990s); Kirstin Lustila,
Ethical Duties of Expert Supreme Court Counsel, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 659, 665 (2011)
(reporting that the number of amicus filings in support of petitions for certiorari in the Supreme
Court increased by more than 40% from 1982 to 2002).
132. See infra Appendix.
133. See, e.g., Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 92–93 (1942) (holding that
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second, briefs arguing that various tasks were work activities that should
be included in the calculation of “hours worked;”134 and third, briefs
arguing that purported waivers from the FLSA’s protection were not
enforceable.135
Another surprising finding was the number of early amicus briefs filed
in state appellate courts, which have concurrent jurisdiction over FLSA
claims.136 The Roosevelt administration filed twenty-five amicus briefs in
state appellate courts.137 Roosevelt also filed forty-nine amicus briefs in the
federal courts of appeal and twenty-two in the U.S. Supreme Court.
The number of agency amicus briefs in FLSA cases declined
dramatically during subsequent administrations. Eisenhower’s DOL filed
nineteen briefs; Kennedy, three; Johnson, nine; Nixon, fourteen; Ford,
three; Carter, seven; Reagan, seven; and Bush I, four.138 There are several
possible explanations for the decline in the DOL’s filing of amicus briefs
in FLSA cases after the Truman administration. First, the scope of the
FLSA became relatively well established during the Roosevelt and Truman
administrations, with thirty Supreme Court opinions clarifying its basic
coverage. As the FLSA became a more routine aspect of doing business,
the agency’s amicus appearances may not have been as necessary. Second,
the number of statutes being enforced by the DOL increased substantially
and amicus efforts shifted to shaping the contours of the new statutes.
oil rig workers were engaged in interstate commerce and therefore covered by the FLSA);
Overstreet v. N. Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 132 (1943) (holding employees who maintained toll
road were engaged in interstate commerce); McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1943)
(holding cooks not engaged in interstate commerce); Walton v. S. Package Corp., 320 U.S. 540,
542–43 (1944) (holding that a watchman was engaged in interstate commerce); Borden Co. v.
Borella, 325 U.S. 679, 684 (1945) (holding maintenance employees are engaged in interstate
commerce if they work in a building that is engaged in interstate commerce); 10 East 40th St. Bldg.,
Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578, 583 (1945) (holding that renting office space was “local business” and
not interstate commerce).
134. See, e.g., Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946) (holding
walking time and preliminary activities may be compensable time under FLSA if not “de minimis”);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944) (holding that waiting time is compensable).
135. See, e.g., 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199, 209–10 (1947) (holding
work agreement did not deprive employees of right to overtime compensation); Martino v. Mich.
Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173, 177–78 (1946) (holding work agreement did not deprive
employees of right overtime compensation).
136. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). FLSA claims filed in state court today are typically
removed to federal court by the employer.
137. See, e.g., Colbeck v. Dairyland Creamery Co., 17 N.W.2d 262 (S.D. 1945); Umthun v.
Day & Zimmerman, 16 N.W.2d 258 (Iowa 1944); Stoike v. First Nat’l Bank of N.Y., 48 N.E.2d
482 (N.Y. 1943); Floyd v. Du Bois Soap Co., 41 N.E.2d 393 (Ohio 1942); Johnson v. PhillipsButtorff Mfg. Co., 160 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn. 1942); Ikola v. Snoqualmie Falls Lumber Co., 121 P.2d
369 (Wash. 1942) (en banc); Tidewater Optical Co. v. Wittkamp, 19 S.E.2d 897 (Va. 1942); Reck
v. Zarnocay, 33 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., 17
N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
138. See infra Appendix (listing cases by administration).
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While the number of FLSA amicus briefs declined, the DOL continued to
appear as an amicus curiae (and frequent litigant) in cases involving the
many other statutes which it enforced.139 For example, the Kennedy
administration focused its litigation efforts on enforcing the nascent Equal
Pay Act. The Carter administration also vigorously litigated the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.
In addition to its amicus efforts, the DOL files direct enforcement
actions under the FLSA and other worker protection statutes, which can
dominate the resources of the Solicitor of Labor’s office. According to a
former attorney who worked in the appellate division of the DOL’s Office
of Solicitor from 1978 to 2005, amicus filings during the Carter, Reagan,
and Bush I administrations were rare and tended to be submitted only in
response to a specific court request.140 Prior to the Clinton administration,
the DOL focused the resources of the Office of Solicitor on direct
enforcement efforts, in which the agency filed suit as a plaintiff on behalf
of employees.141 Attorneys were simply too busy with their own litigation
dockets to monitor and become embroiled in private litigation as an
amicus.142
Under President Clinton, the DOL once again began to submit amicus
curiae briefs in private FLSA litigation with greater frequency, filing
twenty-two amicus briefs. The Clinton administration’s amicus activity
was an extension of beefed up wage and hour enforcement efforts on
behalf of low-wage workers, which focused largely on the misclassification
of employees in certain industries as exempt from the FLSA. These cases
included, for example, Heath v. Perdue Farms, Inc.,143 which held that
chicken catchers had been misclassified as independent contractors and
139. The statutes enforced by the DOL are too numerous to list here, but the most well known
and actively litigated include the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–
678 (2006), which establishes health and safety standards; the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006), which regulates employers who offer
pension or welfare benefits to employees; the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2601–2654 (2006), which provides up to twelve weeks of unpaid job-protected leave to certain
employees for serious medical conditions or after the birth or adoption of a child; and a host of
other employment laws dealing with unemployment, whistleblowers, labor management, mine
safety, workers’ compensation, veterans, and standards for particular types of occupations and
government contracts. For information about laws enforced by the DOL, see Summary of the Major
Laws of the Department of Labor, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/opa/aboutdol/
lawsprog.htm (last visited June 14, 2013). In addition, at one time the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29
U.S.C. §§ 206(d) (2006), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621–634 (2006), were enforced by the DOL because these laws are subsections of the FLSA.
They were eventually transferred to the EEOC for enforcement.
140. Telephone Interview with Leif Jorgenson, former Appellate Counsel for the DOL Office
of the Solicitor (Sept. 14, 2011) (notes on file with author).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 87 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Md. 2000).
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were entitled to overtime;144 Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, Inc.,145
which held that migrant farmworkers were engaged in seasonal work and
were protected by the FLSA;146 and Torres-Lopez v. May,147 and Antenor v.
D&S Farms,148 which held that the growers and labor contractors were
joint employers under the FLSA.149 The DOL also filed amicus briefs in
several cases involving the same issue as in Auer: whether docking salaried
employees’ pay caused the loss of the “white collar” exemption.150
During the Bush administration the number of DOL amicus filings in
FLSA cases increased to twenty-three.151 Many of these briefs—for the
first time in the DOL’s history—were filed on behalf of employers rather
than employees. The Bush DOL submitted ten amicus briefs in favor of
employers in FLSA cases152 and twelve in favor of employees.153 One brief
144. Id. at 454, 457–59, 463.
145. 993 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1993).
146. Id. at 1507, 1513–14.
147. 111 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1997).
148. 88 F.3d 925 (11th Cir. 1996).
149. Id. at 937–38; Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 642–44.
150. See, e.g., Klem v. Santa Clara, 208 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000); Belcher v. Shoney’s,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1011 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
151. See infra Appendix.
152. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Long Island
Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007) (No. 06-593), 2007 WL 579234; Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc.,
538 U.S. 691 (2003) (No. 02-337), 2003 WL 1192669; Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellants, Long John Silver’s Rests., Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2008)
(No. 06-1259), 2006 WL 1911678; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendant-Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing, Pirant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202 (7th
Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1055); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendant-Appellant, Buckner v. Fla. Habilitation Network, Inc., 489 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2007)
(No. 06-11032); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of DefendantsAppellees, Cook v. Diana Hays & Options, Inc., 212 F. App’x 295, 296 (5th Cir. 2006) (No. 0630856); Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd.,
462 F.3d 48 (2nd Cir. 2006); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Gieg v. DDR, Inc.,
407 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-35619); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Defendant-Appellee Delta Recycling Corp. Supporting Affirmance of the District
Court, Niland v. Delta Recycling Corp., 377 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-14553), 2004 WL
2445519; Amicus Brief, Harris v. Superior Court, 171 P.3d 545 (Cal. 2007) (No. S156555), 2008
WL 6083951.
153. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21
(2005); Amicus Curiae Brief at 1, 8–9, Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132 (2d
Cir. 2008) (No. 06-4137); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1–2, De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361 (3d Cir. 2007) (No.
06-3502), 2008 WL 5788178; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellants at 1–2, Senger v. City of Aberdeen, S.D., 466 F.3d 670 (8th Cir. 2006) (No.
05-3803); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellees
at 2–3, Belt v. EmCare, Inc., 444 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-40370); Brief for the Secretary
of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Megan McLaughlin at 1–2,
McLaughlin v. Bos. Harbor Cruise Lines, Inc., 419 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1519), 2004
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supported employees on one issue, and the employer on another.154 Prior to
this time, the DOL had filed amicus briefs favoring an employer’s position
only three times, and that was typically in response to court requests for the
agency’s views.155 In contrast, the Bush DOL became an advocate for
employers on its own initiative, using a bold, coordinated opinion letter
and amicus brief strategy to narrow the scope of many FLSA provisions
and, in some instances, to overturn prior DOL interpretations that had
favored workers. The Bush DOL’s double-barreled opinion letter and
amicus approach to limit FLSA protections is analyzed below in Part
II.F.1.
Whereas the Bush DOL favored business interests, the Obama DOL
increased both direct enforcement efforts and amicus activity in FLSA
cases. In just three years, the Obama administration submitted more FLSA
amicus briefs—forty-three as of December 31, 2012—than the Bush
administration submitted in eight years (twenty-three). The Obama
administration filed amicus briefs favoring an employer’s position in two
FLSA cases, at the request of the court.156
WL 5663334; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition for Panel
Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1–2, Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc., 360 F.3d 274 (1st
Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-1679, 02-1739), 2003 WL 23678322; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as
Amicus Curiae at 1–2, O’Brien v. Town of Agawam, 350 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 2003) (No. 03-1685),
2004 WL 5660200; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 7–
10, Bailey v. Gulf Coast Transp., Inc., 280 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-12379), 2001 WL
34120388; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 9–11, Intracomm, Inc. v. Bajaj, 492
F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1516), 2007 WL 1285885; Brief of the Secretary of Labor as
Amicus in the Disposition of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 14–20, Mullins v. City of
New York, 554 F. Supp. 2d 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (1: 04-cv-2979); Secretary of Labor’s Brief as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, Dege v.
Hutchinson Tech., Inc, No. 06-3754 (DWF/RLE), 2007 WL 3275111 (D. Minn. Nov. 2, 2007) (No.
06-3754).
154. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 26–27, Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339
F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-35042, 02-35110), 2002 WL 32154024, at *26–27.
155. The first amicus on behalf of an employer, by the Truman administration in VermilyaBrown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948), argued that the FLSA did not apply to employees
working on a United States military base outside the sovereign territory of the United States. See
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5–8, Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377
(1940) (No. 22), 1948 WL 47165 at *5–8. In Robinson v. Barrow-Penn & Co., 194 Va. 632 (1953),
the DOL’s brief argued that the Motor Carrier Act applied to the plaintiff truck drivers, precluding
overtime pay under the FLSA. In Auer, upon Court request, the Clinton DOL submitted a brief that
favored the employer given the facts at issue, but the underlying standard favored employees in
other cases. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, 8–11, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452 (1997) (No. 95-897), 1996 WL 595843, at *1, *8–11.
156. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 1, 17–18, Parth v. Pomona
Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 630 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-55022) (arguing that only bona fide
wage rate changes not designed to flout overtime requirements were permissible and that the rate
change at issue satisfied that standard); Gallo v. Essex Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 10-10260-DPW,
2011 WL 1155385, at *6 n.6, 7 (D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2011) (arguing that county sheriff’s office was
immune from private FLSA action).
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The zeal with which the Bush and Obama administrations used amicus
briefs to advocate on behalf of certain favored groups—industry under
President Bush and workers under President Obama—caused wild flipflops in the DOL’s position on certain issues during a short period of time.
In the process, the DOL lost credibility with some courts, which refused to
defer to certain inconsistent DOL positions from the Clinton (which
favored employees), to the Bush (which changed some pro-employee
positions to favor industry), to the Obama administrations (which tried to
restore interpretations back to pro-employee, pre-Bush interpretations).157
The Article returns to an analysis of the amicus activity of these
administrations, and the chaos and confusion it caused on some issues, in
Part II.F, infra.
C. Courts Are Likely to Rule Consistently with the DOL’s Amicus
Position
Lower courts are likely to rule consistently with the position in the
DOL’s amicus brief, even if the court does not explicitly refer to a
particular deference doctrine or to the DOL’s brief. The DOL’s amicus
position prevailed at an overall rate of 66% (185 out of 281 cases), and lost
34% of the time (96 out of 281 cases).158
The agency’s position prevailed most frequently in federal district
courts (76% of cases), then state courts (69%), then federal courts of
appeal (65%) and the U.S. Supreme Court (64%). Table 2 shows the rate at
which the agency’s position prevailed at each court level.
Table 2: Overall Rate that Court Favored DOL Amicus Position: By
Court Level
Court Level
U.S. Supreme Court
Federal Circuit
Federal District
State Appellate
Total

DOL
Position
Favored
64%
23
65%
123
76%
13
69%
25
66% 186

DOL
Position
Failed
36%
13
35%
67
24%
4
31%
11
34%
95

Total
Cases
36
190
17
36
283

157. See, e.g., Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 598–99 (7th Cir. 2012)
(refusing to defer to DOL’s amicus position on compensability of donning and doffing protective
clothing because of inconsistent interpretations among Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations
and citing other courts of appeal “that have come together in spurning . . . ‘the gyrating agency
letters on the subject.’”) (citations omitted).
158. This calculation was based on 281 cases for which both the DOL’s amicus position and
the court ruling are available. It excludes those cases in which the court did not reach a decision
(due to settlement or withdrawal of the case), cases still pending appeal, and cases for which the
DOL amicus briefs are no longer available.
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For more modern administrations for which complete amicus data sets
are available, Table 3 shows the rate at which courts ruled in favor of the
DOL’s amicus position:
Table 3: Rate at which Courts Ruled Consistently with DOL’s Amicus
Position
Administration

Clinton
Bush
Obama
Totals

Ruling
Consistent with
DOL Position
Percent No.
Cases
65%
13
74%
17
56%
19
64%
49

Ruling Against
DOL Position
Percent
35%
26%
44%
36%

No.
Cases
7
6
15
28

Totals
20
23
34
77

During the Clinton administration, when the DOL became a more
frequent amicus filer, courts followed the position argued by the agency in
65% of cases and against it in 35% of cases. The Bush administration was
the most successful, with its position prevailing in 74% of cases and failing
in 26%. Among the cases from the Obama administration which have been
decided, courts sided with the DOL’s position in 56% of cases, and against
it in 44%.
The more important question for purposes of evaluating the agency
amicus strategy is the impact of deference arguments on the outcome of the
case. The next section analyzes the frequency with which the DOL has
asserted deference principles in its amicus briefs and judicial responses to
those arguments.
D. Deference Arguments Asserted in DOL Amicus Briefs
For most of the FLSA’s history up until the Clinton administration,
many DOL amicus curiae briefs noted—typically in a footnote—that the
interpretations by the Wage and Hour Administrator should be given “great
weight” under United States v. American Trucking Association,159 in which
the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the interpretations of the Motor Carrier
Act by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the DOL Wage and Hour
Division “are entitled to great weight.”160 The DOL amicus briefs that cited
American Trucking pointed out, however, that the Wage and Hour
Administrator’s interpretations “are not, and do not purport to be,
binding.”161 In Skidmore itself, the DOL’s brief simply provided a very
159. 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
160. Id. at 549.
161. DOL Amicus Brief in Miller Hatcheries, Inc. v. I.A. Boyer, 131 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1942),
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technical review of the FLSA and the agency’s prior positions on the issue
of waiting time. Nowhere did the agency request that the Court defer, or
even “respect,” the agency’s interpretations.
After Skidmore, the DOL’s amicus briefs typically requested that the
Wage and Hour Administrator’s position be given great weight or respect,
but, with a few exceptions, did not request formal deference until the
Clinton administration. In two early cases, the DOL argued that its
interpretation of its own regulations should be entitled to controlling
weight pursuant to Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., a pre-cursor to
the Auer decision.162 The only pre-Clinton administration brief that
asserted Chevron deference was Dybach v. State of Florida Department of
Corrections,163 during the administration of President George H.W. Bush.
The DOL’s brief argued that its regulation defining the professional
exemption was entitled to deference under Chevron and that the plaintiff
probation officer did not fall under the exemption.164 The court noted that
it was ultimately responsible for interpreting the language of statutes and
cited Chevron in deferring to the DOL’s application of the professional
exemption.165
The Clinton administration—during which Auer was decided—was the
first to consistently request judicial deference to the agency’s position in its
amicus briefs, arguing for some type of deference in twelve out of twentytwo briefs.166 Only one brief requested Skidmore review alone, with ten
briefs asserting more controlling deference under Auer, Chevron or a
combination thereof. In the amicus brief submitted in Auer itself, the DOL
asserted deference under Martin v. OSHRC,167 in which the Court, without
citing Chevron, had granted substantial deference to the Occupational
Safety and Health Review’s Commission interpretation of its own
regulations.168
The Bush DOL argued for deference—and typically controlling
deference—in all but five of its twenty-three amicus briefs. The Bush DOL
invoked Chevron seven times, Auer three times, and Chevron/Auer in
at 4 (on file with the U.S. Dep’t of Labor).
162. Bogash v. Baltimore Cigarette Serv., Inc., 193 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1951); Berlin v. Eimer
& Amend, 66 N.E.2d 584 (N.Y. 1946).
163. 942 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1991).
164. Brief of U.S. Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Dybach, 942 F.2d 1561 (No. 90-3238)
(on file with author).
165. 942 F.2d at 1565.
166. Brief of U.S. Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curie at 22–23 n.7, Gray v. Swanney-McDonald,
Inc., 436 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1971) (Nos. 24476, 24504) (citing Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S 134
(1944); Brief of U.S. Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Baird v. Wagoner Trans. Co., 425 F.2d 407
(6th Cir. 1970) (Nos. 19570-1) (citing Boutell v. Walling, 327 U.S. 463, 470–71 (1946); United
States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940).
167. 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991).
168. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (No.
95-897), 1996 WL 595843.
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combination two times. It relied on Skidmore six times. The Obama DOL
invoked Auer seven times, Chevron seven times, a Chevron/Auer
combination three times, and Skidmore fourteen times.
The breakdown of the type of deference asserted by the DOL in its
amicus briefs, and the rate at which the court ruled consistently with the
agency’s position in those cases, is reflected below in Table 4:
Table 4: Type of Deference Argued in DOL Amicus Briefs (From
Clinton to Obama)169
Type of
Deference
Argued

Number
of Briefs

Auer
Chevron
Chevron/Auer
Skidmore

17
14
7
17

Rate at which courts ruled
consistently with DOL
position
Number of
Percent
Cases
8
47%
11
79%
3
43%
10
47%

In examining the overall success rate of formal deference arguments
from Clinton through Obama, the most successful, not surprising given its
controlling weight, has been Chevron (79% success rate), followed by Auer
(47% success rate) and Skidmore (47%). But, as described in the next
section, courts typically do not identify the deference regime on which they
relying, if any, when ruling in favor of a position advocated by the DOL.
In seventeen cases during the Clinton, Bush and Obama
administrations, the DOL did not assert a particular deference doctrine in
its amicus brief. These tended to be procedural issues rather than
substantive interpretive issues. For example, in Bruer v. Jim’s Concrete of
Brevard,170 the agency explained that a FLSA action filed in state court
may be removed to federal court and a unanimous Court agreed. In Niland
v. Delta Recycling Corp.,171 the DOL clarified that an employee who had
accepted back pay as part of a DOL supervised audit of FLSA violations
had waived his right to later sue for the same violation.172 Other briefs
involved class certification or supplemental jurisdiction issues,173 a current
169. This table excludes cases that are still pending or in which the court did not rule on the
merits for other reasons (such as a settlement).
170. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Breuer v. Jim’s
Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691 (2003) (No. 02-337), 2003 WL 1192669, at *3–4.
171. 377 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004).
172. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee
Delta Recycling Corp. Supporting Affirmance of the District Court at 11–12, Niland v. Delta
Recycling Corp., 377 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-14553), 2004 WL 2445519.
173. Class actions are not permitted under the FLSA. Instead, every employee who wants to
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cutting-edge issue in FLSA litigation but one for which the agency lacks a
long enforcement record.174 The only procedural brief that was not
successful was the Bush DOL’s argument on behalf of an employer that an
arbitrator in a FLSA case had manifestly disregarded the law by allowing a
FLSA claim for back wages to proceed as an opt out class action rather
than an opt in collective action required for FLSA court proceedings.175
The Clinton amicus briefs that did not cite to some type of deference—all
of which were successful—involved employee misclassification issues,176
with one brief arguing that plaintiffs may proceed anonymously in FLSA
actions.177
E. Court Response to Amicus Arguments
Even prior to Skidmore, some courts expressed the need to respect the
DOL’s amicus position in FLSA cases. The Supreme Court had
pronounced a similar standard more than a century before Skidmore in
Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby,178 stating: “In the construction of a doubtful
and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who were
called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions
into effect, is entitled to very great respect.”179 Some courts relied on this

join the case must affirmatively “opt in” to the action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). Two Obama
administration amicus briefs argued that a FLSA collective action can proceed together with a state
wage law class claim. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, 6–8, Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs., Inc., 632 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 093029), 2009 WL 6504100; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 1, 5–7, Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234 (2d
Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1884), 2011 WL 1246654. Another concerned the calculation of overtime wages
on a representative basis in a FLSA collective action. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 1, 10–11, Baden-Winterwood v. Life Time
Fitness, Inc., 566 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2009) (Nos. 10-4269, 10-4361).
174. Unlike private right of action cases, in cases filed by the Secretary employees cannot opt
in individually. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“The right provided by this subsection to bring an
action by or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any employee to become a party plaintiff to
any such action, shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor . . . .”).
175. See Long John Silver’s Rest., Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2008); Brief of the
Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 8–9, Long John Silver’s Rests., Inc.
v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-1259).
176. See Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1070–73 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding plaintiffs in FLSA case may proceed anonymously); Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d
633 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding grower was joint employer of farm workers); Antenor v. D&S Farms,
88 F.3d 925 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); Cara-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, Inc., 993 F.2d 1500 (11th
Cir. 1993) (holding employees were engaged in seasonal agricultural work and were therefore
protected by the FLSA).
177. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 1–3, Does I thru XXIII v.
Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-16713).
178. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 (1827).
179. Id. at 210.
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concept in pre-Skidmore FLSA cases.180 For example, in Umthun v. Day &
Zimmerman181—decided one month before Skidmore—the Iowa Supreme
Court wrote: “This construction of the statute by the administrative
department charged with its enforcement, although not binding on us,
should be given our respectful consideration.”182 After Skidmore, a handful
of courts explicitly discussed the need to give “respect” or “great weight”
to the agency’s interpretations.183 But just a year after Skidmore, the
Supreme Court refused to defer to the DOL’s position in Jewell Ridge Coal
Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of America.184
Jewell Ridge concerned the compensability of the time that coal miners
spent in underground travel from mine to mine.185 In 1940, in response to
various wage investigations by the DOL, coal mining companies and
unions jointly sent a letter to the Wage and Hour Administrator arguing
that such travel time should not be compensated.186 They pleaded that
“such a change ‘would create so much confusion in the bituminous
industry as to result in complete chaos, and would probably result in a
complete stoppage of work at practically all of the coal mines in the United
States.’”187 In response, the DOL issued an opinion letter blessing the
practice of excluding travel time as the custom and practice in coal mining
collective bargaining agreements.188
In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected the DOL’s interpretation as
“legally untenable” and therefore “lack[ing] the usual respect to be
accorded the Administrator’s rulings, interpretations and opinions” under
Skidmore.189 The Court found that the miners’ underground travel satisfied
the test for “work time” under the FLSA.190 The Court based its rejection
of the DOL’s acceptance of the industry-union compromise on the
180. See., e.g., Missel v. Overnight Motor Transp. Co., 126 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1942) (relying on
United States v. American Trucking Ass’n); Bumpus v. Continental Baking Co., 124 F.2d 549, 552
(6th Cir. 1941) (citing Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby).
181. 16 N.W.2d 258 (Iowa 1944).
182. Id. at 259 (citation omitted).
183. See Fred Wolferman, Inc. v. Gustafson, 169 F.2d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 1948); Anderson v.
Manhattan Lighterage Corp., 148 F.2d 971, 973 (2d Cir. 1945) (granting Skidmore-like deference
without citing Skidmore).
184. 325 U.S. 161, 169 (1945).
185. Id. at 162.
186. Id. at 183.
187. Id. at 183–85 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (describing letter to Administrator by coal
companies and unions).
188. See id. at 187–88 (citing 3 Wage and Hour Rep. 332, 333). The Administrator’s Letter
stated that “working time on a ‘face to face’ basis in the bituminous coal mining industry would not
be unreasonable.” Id.
189. Id. at 169 (majority opinion).
190. Id. at 166. Specifically, the travel time in the mines 1) involved physical or mental
exertion; 2) that was controlled or required by the employer; and 3) was pursued necessarily and
primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business. See id. at 163–66.
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remedial purpose of the statute, stating that the FLSA was not designed to
“allow an employer to claim all of an employee’s time while compensating
him only for a part of it. Congress intended, instead, to achieve a uniform
national policy of guaranteeing compensation for all work or employment
engaged in by employees covered by the Act.”191
Justice Robert Jackson dissented, blasting the majority’s refusal to defer
to the DOL. After describing the Administrator’s opinion letter, he stated:
“We have admonished lower courts that they must give heed to these
interpretations. The District Court in this case did so, only to find them
brushed aside here as of no importance.”192
Thus, since the New Deal, the Court has sent mixed signals about the
degree of weight to give to the DOL’s amicus positions. Perhaps given this
confusion, most courts simply do not address deference principles at all. In
the vast majority of the cases in this study, courts did not cite or discuss a
deference framework, even when they ruled consistently with the DOL’s
position. Some courts mentioned the DOL’s amicus brief or characterized
it as “quite informative” in reaching a decision, but did not discuss
deference principles.193
Only nineteen cases in the database deferred to the DOL’s amicus
position with a citation to controlling deference under Auer or Chevron.
Chevron has been cited as a reason for deferring to the DOL’s
interpretation seven times.194 Since Auer was decided, twelve cases have
cited or relied on it in deferring to the DOL’s interpretation.195 In Long
Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, the Court cited both Chevron and Auer
in unanimously deferring to the DOL’s informal interpretations that were
191. Id. at 167 (quoting Tennessee Coal Co.v. Muscoda Local, 321 U.S. 590, 602 (1944)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
192. Id. at 188 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
193. See, e.g., Schmidtke v. Conesa, 141 F.2d 634, 635–36 (1st Cir. 1944) (referring to amicus
brief in reaching decision); Tidewater Optical Co. v. Wittkamp, 19 S.E.2d 897, 899 (Va. 1942)
(referring to DOL amicus brief as “quite informative” about purpose of the FLSA). William
Eskridge has characterized cases in which courts follow the agency but do not identify a deference
framework as “consultative deference.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1473–74 (2008).
194. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171–74 (2007); Buckner
v. Fla. Habilitation Network, Inc., 489 F.3d 1151, 1155–56 (11th Cir. 2007); Senger v. City of
Aberdeen, 466 F.3d 670, 672–74 (8th Cir. 2006); Kosakow v. New Rochelle Med. Assocs., P.C.,
274 F.3d 706 (2nd Cir. 2001); see also Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 1565
(11th Cir. 1991) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984)).
195. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007); Fast v.
Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 638 F.3d 872, 878–79 (8th Cir. 2011); Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d
587, 590 (11th Cir. 2011); Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Serv., Inc., 616 F.3d 1217, 1225 (11th
Cir. 2010); In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2010); Intracomm, Inc v.
Bajaj, 492 F.3d 285, 293 (4th Cir. 2007); Belt v. EmCare, Inc., 444 F.3d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 2006);
Takacs v. Hahn Auto. Corp., 246 F.3d 776, 782 (6th Cir. 2001); Yourman v. Giuliani, 229 F.3d
124, 128 (2d Cir. 2000).
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developed during pending litigation.196 Twelve cases cited the “great
weight” standard from Skidmore, Christensen, or Mead.197
Courts did not identify a deference principle in the vast majority (more
than 80%) of the cases in which they ruled consistently with the DOL’s
amicus position. Given that courts often do not refer to the agency’s
amicus brief or pinpoint a controlling deference framework, it is difficult to
conclude with any certainty whether judges are relying on, or even reading,
agency amicus briefs or are simply convinced by one of the parties. Prior
surveys of federal judges, however, have indicated that judges find amicus
briefs by government agencies to be “moderately” or “very helpful” in
resolving disputes.198 Administrative law scholars also have concluded
based on empirical analysis that government amicus curiae briefs have an
impact on the Supreme Court.199
When President Bush took over the DOL, Auer empowered the agency
to exploit amicus arguments to narrow the FLSA’s protections and expand
its exemptions. Eight years later, the Obama DOL used amicus briefs to
reinvigorate FLSA enforcement on behalf of workers. The next section
explains how the Bush and Obama DOLs used amicus strategies more
aggressively than any administration since Roosevelt to accomplish their
policy priorities. The juxtaposition of these two administrations shows the
exceptional power of the agency amicus strategy of policy making in the
courts. In the long run, however, political flip-flops from administration to
administration in the enforcement of the FLSA will harm the presumption
that the agency is operating in good faith, and with special technical
expertise, to execute Congress’s remedial intent when it passed the FLSA.

196. Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 171–74.
197. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335–36
(2011); Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc., 669 F.3d 428, 428–39 (4th Cir. 2012); Perez v. Mountaire
Farms, Inc. 650 F.3d 350, 371 (4th Cir. 2011); Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d
132, 149 (2d Cir. 2008); McLaughlin v. Boston Harbor Cruise Lines, Inc., 419 F.3d 47, 50 (1st Cir.
2005); Anderson v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1354–55 (M.D. Ala. 2009); see also
Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc., 360 F.3d 274, 286 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001)).
198. One survey of federal judges found that “[a]micus curiae briefs offered by governmental
entities were favored at all levels of the federal bench.” Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical
Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism,
27 REV. LITIG. 669, 697 (2008). Three Supreme Court respondents found agency amicus briefs to be
“very helpful to the Court.” Id. In addition, “the Circuit and District Court respondents ranked the
government as the most helpful amicus curiae, with 96.3% of Circuit Court and 86.4% of District
Court respondents indicating that the government is either moderately or very helpful.” Id. (citation
omitted).
199. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 14, at 828–30.
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F. Bush and Obama Use Deference Frameworks to Establish FLSA
Policy in the Courts
1. Bush Used a Coordinated Opinion Letter and Amicus Strategy to
Undermine FLSA Coverage
Armed with the power of Auer, although somewhat tempered by
Christensen and Mead, President George W. Bush came to office and
appointed former management-side litigators to lead the DOL’s Office of
Solicitor and Wage and Hour Division. President Bush first appointed
Eugene Scalia to be the Solicitor of Labor through a recess appointment,
but he was not confirmed due to controversy surrounding his
nomination.200 Howard Radzely, a former clerk to Justice Scalia who spent
his career representing employers, then took the helm.201 As historian
Nelson Lichtenstein wrote: “The Scalia nomination was characteristic of
Bush’s approach to the nation’s labor standards regime: put an ideological
fox in the regulatory henhouse, and then watch the fireworks explode.”202
Legal scholar Susan Bisom-Rapp writes that the Bush DOL “was a model
of industry capture.”203
Early in the Bush administration, the DOL used formal rulemaking to
amend the regulations regarding the professional, executive, and
administrative exemptions to overtime pay.204 Its proposed revisions were
subjected to intense criticism, prompting more than 75,000 public
comments and a threat from Congress “to deny funding for any DOL
action that would exempt employees currently eligible for overtime
pay.”205 In the end, the administration was forced to compromise or
200. Audrey Hudson, Justice’s Son Resigns from Labor Position, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003,
at A5 (noting that Scalia was recess-appointed Solicitor of Labor in January 2001, named Acting
Solicitor in November 2002 when the recess appointment expired, and resigned in January 2003
before his confirmation hearing).
201. 149 CONG. REC. S16214 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (noting the Senate’s confirmation of
Howard Radzely); see also Nomination of Howard M. Radzely, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Health, Educ., Labor,& Pensions, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (2003) (statement of Sen. Gregg).
202. Nelson Lichtenstein, Ideology and Interest on the Social Policy Home Front, in THE
PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH: A FIRST HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT 169, 177 (Julian E. Zelizer ed.,
2010).
203. Susan Bisom-Rapp, What We Learn in Troubled Times: Deregulation and Safe Work in
the New Economy, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1197, 1202 (2009). Professor Bison-Rapp was referring to the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, a division of the DOL. Id. (“The agency withdrew
numerous proposed regulations, delayed others, modified warnings based on industry pressure, and
emasculated its cooperative programming.”).
204. See, e.g., Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative,
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,559, 15,560 (proposed Mar.
31, 2003) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
205. Regan C. Rowan, Comment, Solving the Bluish Collar Problem: An Analysis of the
DOL’s Modernization of the Exemptions to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 119, 122 n.23 (2004) (describing controversy over proposed amendments); see also William J.
Kilberg & Jason C. Schwartz, Saga of Reform: Regulation of Worker Overtime, 8 BRIEFLY 4, 18
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abandon many of its proposals in the final promulgated regulations.206
In the judicial arena, the Bush administration used amicus briefs to limit
the reach of worker protection statutes in a more subtle manner that
avoided public scrutiny and compromises. The Bush DOL utilized a
coordinated opinion letter and amicus strategy that was bolder and
different from prior administrations in at least three ways. First, in the
midst of litigation pending in the federal courts, the Wage and Hour
Administrator—a political appointee—issued opinion letters requested by
industry trade groups of which the defendants in the pending FLSA
litigation were members. These opinion letters were sometimes issued on
the heels of a court judgment that had favored employees. Second, the new
opinion letters often withdrew prior opinion letters—sometimes spanning
multiple prior administrations—and set forth in great detail a new,
inconsistent interpretation.207 Third, the new interpretation typically
favored industry rather than workers, running contrary to long-standing
FLSA doctrine that the exemptions must be narrowly construed against
employers208 and that the Act must be construed liberally to accomplish its
remedial purpose.209
Even more troubling, the Bush DOL then appeared as an amicus in
private litigation matters and urged the court to grant “great deference” to
the new opinion letter and reverse prior court rulings that had favored
(2004), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/sept04-sagareformregof
overtimekilbergschwartz.pdf (“The proposed changes drew intense criticism and were portrayed as
an effort by business groups and their Republican allies to deprive middle and lower income
Americans of their overtime payments—to make them work harder for less money.”).
206. See Kilberg & Schwartz, supra note 205, at 20–29 (describing how “the final rule is a
compromise product”).
207. See, e.g., Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 22–23 app. A, Alvarez v.
IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-35042, 02-35110) (withdrawing three earlier
opinion letters and requesting Skidmore deference for new, contradictory opinion letter); Dougherty
v. Teva Pharm. USA, 2007 WL 1165068 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007) (DOL invoked Chevron deference
for amicus interpretation of regulation which contradicted 1994 opinion letter); Brief of the
Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider the August
30, 2006 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary
Judgment at 10–13, Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 05-2336, 2007 WL 1165068 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 9, 2007) (No. 05-02336) (invoking Chevron deference for amicus interpretation of
regulation which contradicted 1994 opinion letter).
208. Employers bear the burden of proving the applicability of an exemption. See Corning
Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196–97 (1974).
209. See A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (“To extend an exemption to
other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretative
process and to frustrate the announced will of the people.”); Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy &
Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (stating that the FLSA “has been construed liberally to apply to
the furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction”); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462
(1997) (“FLSA exemptions are to be ‘narrowly construed against . . . employers’ and are to be
withheld except as to persons ‘plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.’”) (quoting
Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)).
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employees.210 The DOL either filed an amicus at the district court level
supporting the employer’s request for reconsideration in light of the new
opinion letter or participated as an amicus in the court of appeals. The
subsections below provide examples of the Bush DOL’s strategy of using
opinion letters, together with amicus filings, to support regulated interests
in narrowing the coverage of the FLSA.
a. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.
Consider Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.,211 an overtime case against a
meatpacking company.212 This well-known case ultimately made its way to
the Supreme Court, which held that the time that meatpacking employees
spent walking between the location where they don and doff protective
gear to their work stations should be included in the calculation of hours
worked under the FLSA.213 The DOL’s amicus activity in this case at the
lower court level, however, is less well known and provides the earliest
example of the Bush DOL using an opinion letter and amicus brief, along
with deference arguments, in an attempt to narrow FLSA coverage.
On September 14, 2001, the district court held that IBP had willfully
violated the FLSA by not including the time that workers spent donning
and doffing protective gear and walking to their work stations.214 The court
also rejected IBP’s defense that the union workers at the plant were not
entitled to compensation for donning and doffing under 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(o), which provides that an employer does not have to pay for time
spent “changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each work
day” if such time is excluded from working time “by the express terms of
or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining
agreement.”215 Eight months after the court ruled against IBP, the DOL
issued an opinion letter to the American Meat Institute,216 of which IBP
was a member, that withdrew three prior DOL opinion letters from 1997,
1998, and 2001 that had consistently found that donning and doffing time
210. Examples include the DOL’s amicus briefs in Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., Geig v. DDR, Inc. and
in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, described in the following subsections.
211. No. CT–98–5005–RHW, 2001 WL 34897841 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 14, 2001).
212. Id. at *1.
213. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005).
214. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., No. CT–98–5005–RHW, 2001 WL 34897841, at *10 (E.D. Wash.
Sept. 14, 2001).
215. Id. at *2 n.2. The collective bargaining agreements at the plant had a provision for clothes
changing time in 1976 and again for the years 1979–1982, but the provision had been eliminated in
1982. Id. at *15.
216. According to its own brief in Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc., the AMI “is the nation’s oldest
and largest trade association representing packers and processors of beef, pork, lamb, veal, turkey
and processed meat products.” Brief of the National Chicken Council and American Meat Institute
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc., No. 04-66 (1st Cir. Aug.
1, 2005), 2005 WL 1841384, at *2.
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is compensable time that may not be waived for union workers in a
collective bargaining agreement.217
In the appeal of Alvarez to the Ninth Circuit, the DOL supported the
employees on the compensability of donning and doffing time.
Nevertheless, this pro-employee position was undermined by the DOL’s
argument that the court should defer to its new opinion letter—issued after
the district court’s adverse ruling against the employer—that applied
§ 203(o) to the clothes-changing and washing activities of union
employees in the meatpacking industry.218 In other words, the DOL argued
that the time may be compensable for nonunion workers, but not for the
union workers in the case before the court. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the DOL’s “new, inconsistent interpretation,”219 finding
that it directly conflicted with the 1997 opinion letter and was not entitled
to deference because of that inconsistency.220 The Supreme Court did not
consider the § 203(o) issue.
b. Gieg v. DDR, Inc.
The Bush DOL was more successful in achieving a pro-business victory
with an amicus strategy in Gieg v. DDR, Inc.,221 which consolidated three
cases in which district courts had held that finance and insurance managers
of retail automobile dealerships were entitled to overtime pay under the
FLSA.222 After the employees won their motions for summary judgment in
district court (indeed, only three days after the plaintiff won in Gieg), the
DOL issued an opinion letter to the National Automobile Dealers
Association (NADA) stating that a finance and insurance salesperson
employed by a retail automobile dealership was exempt from overtime.223
217. Letter from Tammy D. McCutchen, Administrator of the DOL Wage and Hour Division
to Samuel D. Walker, counsel for the American Meat Institute (June 6, 2002) (attached as
Addendum A to the DOL’s amicus brief). Under § 203(o), the employer does not have to pay for
time spent “changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday” if such time is
excluded from working time “by the express terms [of] or by custom or practice under a bona fide
collective-bargaining agreement.” Id.
218. Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 22, Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894
(9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-35042 and 02-35110), 2002 WL 32154024.
219. Alvarez, 339 F.3d 894, 905–06 n.9.
220. Id. (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (“[a]n agency
interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s earlier interpretation is
entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently held agency view.” (alteration in
original)).
221. 407 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005).
222. Id. at 1041. The consolidated cases consisted of Wickersham v. Haselwood Buick-Pontiac
Co., No. C01-5557FDB, 2002 WL 32152269 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 16, 2002); Geig v. Haselwood
Buick-Pontiac Co., No. Civ. 98-1563-HA, 2003 WL 21087602 (D. Or. Mar. 14, 2003); and
Chaloupka v. SLT/TAG Inc., No. Civ. 02-743-HU, Civ. 02-1053-HU, 2003 WL 23540259 (D. Or.
July 14, 2003).
223. Opinion Letter from Tammy D. McCutchen, Wage and Hour Administrator to Douglas I.
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The DOL then filed amicus briefs supporting the employers on a motion
for reconsideration in the district courts and on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
Other federal district courts had declined to follow the new opinion letter
in unrelated cases involving the same legal issue,224 with one judge finding
that the letter was “inconsistent with, and in fact, ignore[d], regulations”
concerning the exemption.225 The court found that the opinion letter lacked
the power to persuade because it had been solicited “by those associated
with defendants.”226
In its amicus brief in Gieg in the Ninth Circuit, the DOL set forth the
Skidmore framework, under which agency interpretations are entitled to
respect, but then cited a Ninth Circuit case to argue that the court should
give the new opinion letter “great deference,”227 which is more akin to the
Chevron standard. Although the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly address the
deference issue, it ruled consistently with the DOL’s position and reversed
the decisions that had favored the employees.228 The Bush DOL had
therefore succeeded in using its opinion letter and amicus advocacy to
change a pro-employee policy to one that favored the automobile dealer
industry.
c. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke
The Bush DOL also used an amicus strategy to support pro-employer
positions on the question of whether in-home companionship workers who
work for home healthcare companies were entitled to overtime, with an
ultimate victory in the U.S. Supreme Court in Long Island Care at Home,
Ltd. v. Coke.229 Other scholars have described Long Island Care at Home
as an example of the Court’s proper regard for the APA and appropriate
application of Chevron.230 A closer examination of the behind-the-scenes
opinion letter, advisory memorandum, and amicus litigation strategy used
by the agency shows something more politically charged at work.
Greenhas, NADA (Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2003/
2003_03_17_1_FLSA.pdf.
224. Cases declining to follow the new opinion letter include Wickersham, Gieg, and
Chaloupka.
225. Chaloupka, 2003 WL 23540259, at *3.
226. See id. at *3–4.
227. Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 15, Gieg v. DDR, Inc., 407 F.3d
1038 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 03-35707 and 03-36619). The DOL cited Biggs v. Wilson, 1 F.3d 1537,
1543 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1081 (1994), which afforded “great deference” to a
decades-old opinion letters from 1961, 1968, and 1973 that stated that employers must pay
employees on regular paydays and cannot hold wages and “make up the difference at the end of the
month.”
228. Gieg, 407 F.3d 138, 1053.
229. 551 U.S. 158 (2007).
230. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 6, at 721 (stating that “Long Island Care at Home is highly
reminiscent of the approach that was taken by the Court in pre-Chevron cases during the formative
years of the APA”).
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The dispute centered on a 1974 amendment to the FLSA to expand
coverage to “domestic service workers.”231 Congress exempted from
domestic service coverage only those engaged in casual home activities,
such as babysitting or “companionship services,” as “defined and
delimited” by the DOL.232 Shortly thereafter, the DOL engaged in noticeand-comment rulemaking to define the scope of the new provision.233 The
promulgated regulations had an apparent internal inconsistency. One
regulation, entitled “General Regulations” defined exempt domestic
service workers as those employed “in or about a private home . . . of the
person by whom he or she is employed.”234 The General Regulation was
passed through notice-and-comment rulemaking and provided that only
those workers employed directly by the homeowner—not a third party
company—were exempt from overtime.235 Another interpretive regulation,
labeled “Third Party Employment” and not passed through rulemaking,
stated that the exemption included companionship workers who “are
employed by an employer or agency other than the family or household
using their services.”236 This “third-party regulation” suggested that home
health workers, regardless of the employer, are not entitled to overtime.237
Despite this regulatory inconsistency, the DOL had long interpreted
these provisions to mean that home health workers employed by third-party
businesses were entitled to overtime pay.238 The DOL had considered
making a change to the third-party regulation on three occasions over a
fifteen-year period, but had not ultimately changed the regulation nor
changed its interpretation that home health care workers working for
private companies were protected by the FLSA.239
The Bush administration modified the DOL’s long-standing policy in
favor of coverage to one that exempted home healthcare workers employed
231. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 7(b)(1), (2), 88
Stat. 55, 62 (adding home health care workers to minimum wage, 29 U.S.C. § 206(f), and overtime,
id. § 207(l) standards).
232. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (2006).
233. Extension to Domestic Service Employees, 40 Fed. Reg. 7404 (Feb. 20, 1975) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 516, 552).
234. 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (1975).
235. See id.
236. Id. § 552.109(a).
237. See id.
238. See D. Sweeney, DOL Opinion Letter, Home Health Aides/Companionship Exemption,
6A LRR, Wages and Hours Manual 99:8205 (Jan. 6, 1999), available at 1999 WL 1002349
(explaining that employees of third-party employer qualify for the exemption only if they are also
jointly employed “by the family or household using their services”); Application of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to Domestic Service, 58 Fed. Reg. 69,311 (proposed Dec. 30, 1993) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 552).
239. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 163–64 (2007) (citing 58 Fed.
Reg. 69,310-69,312 (1993); 60 Fed. Reg. 46,798 (Sept. 8, 1995); 66 Fed. Reg. 5481, 5485 (Jan. 19,
2001); 67 Fed. Reg. 16,668 (Apr. 8, 2002).
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by third parties from the FLSA. In three circuit court cases, the DOL
submitted amicus briefs arguing that the interpretive third-party regulation,
together with its new opinion letter and amicus interpretation, were entitled
to Chevron deference.240 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits sided with the
agency’s position.241 The Second Circuit, however, held that only the
General Regulation, under which the workers were entitled to overtime,
was entitled to deference under Chevron because it was passed through
notice-and-comment rulemaking.242 The Second Circuit, applying
Skidmore to the interpretive regulation, concluded that it was
“unpersuasive in the context of the entire statutory and regulatory
scheme.”243 The court found that the interpretive regulation contradicted
Congress’s purpose to expand coverage to domestic service employees,244
and that it was “jarringly inconsistent” with other contemporaneous DOL
regulations under which home health workers were entitled to overtime.245
The court noted that the DOL had never adequately explained what
accounted for the agency’s “about-face” in its position.”246
In response to the Second Circuit’s ruling, and after the employer had
sought certiorari in the Supreme Court, the DOL drafted an informal,
internal “Wage and Hour Advisory Memorandum” defending its new proindustry position.247 The Solicitor General then requested that the Supreme
Court vacate the Second Circuit’s decision and remand the case so the
circuit court could consider the Advisory Memorandum.248 The Second
Circuit remained unconvinced and again held the interpretive regulation
unenforceable.249
The Supreme Court then granted the employer’s petition for
certiorari,250 which was supported by the DOL as amicus.251 A unanimous
240. Brief for the Secretary Of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant at
8, Buckner v. Fla. Habilitation Network, Inc., 489 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-11032-EE);
Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellants at 6, Cook
v. Hays, 212 F. App’x 295 (5th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-30856); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as
Amicus Curiae at 12–15, Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 376 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2004)
(No. 03-7666), 2003 WL 24089825 at *14.
241. See Buckner v. Fla. Habilitation Network, Inc., 489 F.3d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 2007);
Cook v. Hays, 212 F. App’x 295, 296–97 (5th Cir. 2006). The Eleventh Circuit ruled after the
Supreme Court decided Long Island Care at Home.
242. 376 F.3d 118, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2004).
243. Id. at 122.
244. Id. at 133.
245. Id. at 133–34.
246. Id. at 134.
247. See Wage and Hour Advisory Memorandum No. 2005-1 (Dec. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/FieldBulletins/AdvisoryMemoranda2005.pdf.
248. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 164 (2007).
249. Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 462 F.3d 48, 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
250. Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 031.
251. Brief of Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 1, Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd.,
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Court afforded Chevron deference to the interpretive regulation and held
that home health care workers employed by third parties were exempt from
the FLSA.252 It did not bother the Court that the agency’s interpretation
was “circuitous and inconsistent,” crafted during pending litigation, and
created a new exemption for workers whom the DOL had considered
entitled to overtime for more than a decade.253 Citing Auer, the Court
stated: “Where, as here, an agency’s course of action indicates that the
interpretation of its own regulation reflects its considered views . . . we
have accepted that interpretation as the agency’s own, even if the agency
set those views forth in a legal brief.”254
After Long Island Care at Home, the DOL publicly proclaimed amicus
briefs as “a very powerful tool” to influence court interpretations.255 The
former Wage and Hour Administrator for the Bush administration
suggested that Long Island Care at Home meant that opinion letters and
other informal agency guidance are entitled to more than Skidmore
deference, stating: “This is a stronger statement of what [Skidmore]
deference means in the context of agency guidance, like an opinion
letter. . . The [C]ourt is clear that courts should give deference so long as it
is not a surprise.”256
As seen in these cases, the Bush DOL exploited informal agency
interpretations, such as opinion letters and amicus briefs, to change certain
FLSA interpretations from pro-employee to pro-employer positions,
asserting Chevron or Auer deference for the new, inconsistent
interpretation. The Bush administration used similar amicus strategies to
urge pro-industry interpretations for other worker protection statues. For
example, the DOL appeared as an amicus supporting corporations in
arguing that employees of subsidiaries of publicly traded companies were
not protected by the whistleblower provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.257 The DOL argued that employers could require employees to waive
267 F. Supp. 2d 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 03-7666), 2003 WL 24089825, at *1.
252. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 462 F.3d at 50, 52 (per curiam).
253. Triplett, supra note 103.
254. Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
255. Michael R. Triplett, DOL Focus on Amicus Briefs, Opinion Letters Pays Off With
Increased Deference by Courts, 217 Daily Lab. Rep. Online (BNA) B-1 (Nov. 9, 2007) (reporting
comments by Paul L. Frieden, head of the appellate litigation department of the DOL Solicitor’s
Office at the American Bar Association’s Labor and Employment Section meeting on November 8,
2007).
256. Michael R. Triplett, Justices Rule 9-0 that Home Health Workers Employed by Third
Parties Not Owed Overtime, 112 Daily Lab. Rep. Online (BNA) AA-1 (June 12, 2007).
257. See, e.g., Brief of Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curiae, In re Ambrose v. U.S. Foodservice
Inc., No. 06-096, 2007 WL 7139500 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor SAROX Sept. 28, 2007) (arguing that
employee of subsidiary of publicly traded company was not covered by SOX whistleblower
provision); Brief of Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curiae, In re Ede v. Swatch Group, No. 05-053,
2007 WL 7143175 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor SAROX, June 27, 2007) (arguing that SOX does not apply
to workers exclusively located outside the United States).
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their rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act.258 The DOL also
submitted amicus briefs in various circuits supporting industry positions
that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempted
attempts by local and state governments to require employers to provide
health insurance benefits to employees.259 Outside of the DOL, the Food
and Drug Administration during the Bush administration used an amicus
approach to change tort law to provide drug and device manufacturers with
greater preemption protection,260 culminating in a victory in Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc.261
At the same time that the Bush DOL tried to narrow the coverage of
worker protection statutes through its amicus advocacy, its affirmative
FLSA enforcement efforts dropped. In the period from 1997 to 2007, the
number of “enforcement actions decreased by more than a third, from
approximately 47,000 actions in 1997 to just under 30,000 in 2007.”262
Most of these cases were initiated by worker complaints rather than

258. See, e.g., Brief of Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee’s
Petition for Rehearing en banc at *2, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007)
(No. 04-1525) , 2005 WL 6718391at *2–3 (arguing that DOL regulation stating “[e]mployees
cannot waive, nor may employer induce employees to waive, their rights under the FMLA” applies
only to prospective waiver of rights, not settlement of private claims); Brief of Dep’t of Labor as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing en
banc at 1, Harrell v. U.S. Postal Service, 445 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2006) (No. 03-4204) (arguing that
employers have the right under the FMLA to apply additional return to work provisions in a
collective bargaining agreement); Brief of Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider the Aug. 30, 2006 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment at 10, Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA, No.
05-2336, 2007 WL 1165068 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 9, 2007) (arguing that DOL’s interpretation of the
FMLA non-waiver provision should be afforded Chevron deference). The Bush DOL also argued
for a narrow interpretation of the term “worksite” under the FMLA regulations, 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.111(a)(3)—under which employers are covered if they employ at least fifty employees within
seventy-five miles of an employee’s worksite—so that the employee in question would not be
covered by the FMLA after she was injured in a car accident. Brief of Dep’t of Labor as Amicus
Curiae, Harbert v. Healthcare Servs. Group, Inc., 391 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1156),
2003 WL 24213885, at *2–5.
259. See, e.g., Brief of the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee and
Requesting Affirmance at 7–13, Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir.
2007) (Nos. 06-1840, 06-1901), 2006 WL 3336531, at *7–13.
260. Two attorneys examined the Food and Drug Administration’s amicus strategy during the
Bush administration to change tort law to provide drug and device manufacturers with greater
preemption protection. See Mark C. Levy & Gregory J. Wartman, Amicus Curiae Efforts to Reform
Product Liability at the Food and Drug Administration: FDA’s Influence on Federal Preemption of
Class III Medical Devices and Pharmaceuticals, 60 FOOD &DRUG L.J. 495 (2005).
261. 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (holding that state law tort claims against a medical device
manufacturer were preempted by federal law).
262. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-962T, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT:
BETTER USE OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND CONSISTENT REPORTING COULD IMPROVE COMPLIANCE 5
(2008).
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proactive agency enforcement.263 The number of enforcement actions
initiated by the agency fell by 45% over the same ten-year period, “from
approximately 13,000 in 1997 to approximately 7000 in 2007.”264
2. The Obama DOL Increased the Use of Amicus Briefs as an
Enforcement Approach
The Obama DOL made the revival of FLSA enforcement a top priority.
For example, the DOL “hired about 300 additional investigators to probe
wage theft complaints.”265 It signed agreements with states and the Internal
Revenue Service to share information “to crack down on businesses that
cheat workers out of their wages.”266 In fiscal year 2011, the Wage and
Hour Division collected nearly $225 million in back wages, which was
“the largest amount collected in a single fiscal year in the Division’s
history.”267
A central part of the Obama DOL’s efforts to reinvigorate FLSA
enforcement on behalf of misclassified and low-wage workers included the
filing of amicus briefs. Through its first term (ending December 31, 2012),
the Obama administration had submitted forty-three amicus briefs in FLSA
cases. It was equally, if not more, active in filing amicus briefs in cases
involving ERISA and other labor statutes enforced by the DOL.268
During its first term, the Obama DOL’s amicus efforts in FLSA cases
were focused on several recurrent issues. First, the DOL argued that oral
complaints of wage violations to an employer are protected by the FLSA’s
anti-retaliation provisions under a long-standing agency position. These
arguments ultimately prevailed in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance
Plastics Corp.269 Second, the DOL filed amicus briefs in cases involving
low-wage and immigrant workers. For example, in Josendis v. Wall to
Wall Residence Repairs, Inc.,270 the DOL submitted an amicus brief
arguing that undocumented workers are entitled to the FLSA’s
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Sam Hananel, Labor Dept. Expands Enforcement of Wage Violations, WALL ST. J., Sept.
19, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/AP1a153b15fbd44922854b2aff6f272223.html.
266. Id.
267. Examining Regulatory and Enforcement Actions Under the Fair Labor Standards Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the
Workforce, 112th Cong. 8, 11 (2011) (Testimony of Nancy J. Leppink, Deputy Wage and Hour
Administrator, U.S. Dep’t of Labor), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG112hhrg70971/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg70971.pdf.
268. During its first term, the Obama DOL filed more than fifty amicus briefs in ERISA cases,
which are posted on the Office of the Solicitor website. See also Robert Steyer, Critics Claim DOL
Using Amicus Briefs to Steer by Pension Roadblocks, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, July 25, 2011,
http://www.pionline.com/article/20110725/PRINTSUB/110729948.
269. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
270. 662 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2011).
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protections.271 In Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Service, Inc.,272 the
agency argued that landscapers who handled tools and materials that
traveled in interstate commerce were protected by the FLSA.273 The DOL
has also weighed in on the proper calculation of minimum wages and
overtime for tipped employees274 and migrant workers.275 Other cases
involved the issue of the compensability of donning and doffing time for
poultry workers.276
Even though the Obama DOL was a much more active amicus filer, it
used a slightly more conservative approach to deference arguments in
amicus briefs. The Obama DOL typically reserved the assertion of Chevron
for those interpretations that had been venerable agency interpretations set
forth in multiple opinion letters277—issued well before the pending
litigation—or long-standing enforcement positions. For example, in Kasten
and other cases involving the question of whether oral complaints of wage
violations to an employer are protected by the FLSA’s anti-retaliation
provisions, the DOL argued that its longstanding interpretation that such
complaints are covered was entitled to Chevron deference.278 Citing
Kasten, the DOL urged deference for its view that a collective action under
the FLSA, in which plaintiffs must “opt in” to the case, is not incompatible
271. Brief of Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Josendis, 662 F.3d 1292 (No. 09-12266). The
court ruled on alternative grounds that the employee was not covered by the FLSA and declined to
rule on the issue that had been briefed by the DOL. Id. at 1320–21.
272. 616 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2010).
273. Id. at 1225.
274. See, e.g., Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Fast v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc.,
638 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-1725, 10-1726); Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus
Curiae, Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., 596 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-35718).
275. See, e.g., Brief of the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 1, Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms,
Inc., No. 11-17365 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2012); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6–8, Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d 587 (11th Cir. 2011)
(No. 10-13412); Brief of the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 1, Ojeda-Sanchez v. Bland Farms,
LLC, No. 11-13835, 2012 WL 6012964 (11th Cir. Nov. 9, 2011).
276. See, e.g., Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants, Lopez v. Tyson Foods, 690 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-2344), 2011 WL
5357150; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Anderson v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 604
F. Supp. 2d 1339 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (No. 1:06–cv–01000–MEF–WC); Brief for the Secretary of
Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650
F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-1917), 2010 WL 1130344.
277. See, e.g., Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants at 12, Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Serv., Inc., 616 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2010) (Nos.
08-15290, 08-15154) (invoking Chevron for opinion letters issued in 1982 and 1997); Brief for the
Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Perez v. Mountaire Farms,
Inc., 650 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-1917), 2010 WL 1130344, at *19–22 (asserting Chevron
deference for opinion letters issued in 1973, 1993, 2001, 2006, and 2007).
278. See, e.g., Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffAppellant at 11–12, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (No. 082820), 2008 WL 5786344.
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with an opt-out class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.279 The Obama DOL typically cited Skidmore and Christensen
as the appropriate level of deference for opinion letters and other informal
guidance,280 and Auer for the agency’s interpretations of its own
ambiguous regulations in amicus briefs.281
In fact, the Obama DOL did away with opinion letters altogether,
replacing them with more general guidance called “Administrator’s
Interpretations.” The agency explained that the interpretations would be a
“more efficient and productive use of resources” than individual opinion
letters focused on narrow factual scenarios, for which “a slight difference
in the assumed facts may result in a different outcome.”282
Ironically, while the dismantling of certain FLSA protections was
quietly accomplished by the Bush administration with an especially
aggressive amicus strategy, the Obama administration was harshly
criticized for attempting “regulation-by-amicus.”283 The backlash came in
response to the Obama DOL’s amicus briefs in cases involving
pharmaceutical detailers in Christopher. This case was different from
many of the other cases in which the Obama DOL appeared as an amicus.
Whereas many of its amicus briefs were filed in cases involving low-wage
workers, the pharmaceutical detailers in Christopher were more highly
paid.284 In addition, unlike most of the other cases in which the Obama
DOL filed amicus briefs, the agency lacked an enforcement record on the
issue of whether pharmaceutical detailers fell under the outside sales
exemption.
The frequency with which the Obama and Bush administrations used
279. Consolidated Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants at 28, Knepper v. Rite Aid, 675 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11-1684, 11-1685), 2011
WL 10007171, at *28.
280. See, e.g., Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffAppellant at 15, 23, Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., 596 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-35718),
2009 WL 2609879 (citing Skidmore review standard for opinion letters); Brief for the Secretary of
Labor as Amicus Curiae at 7, Favors v. Apple Creek Mgmt. Co., No. 11-12277 (11th Cir. 2012),
2012 WL 2510387.
281. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
282. See Wage & Hour Division, Rulings and Interpretations (describing Administrator
Interpretations), http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/opinion.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
283. See, e.g., Mark A. Hoffmann, Overtime Ruling Favors Employers, BUS. INS., June 25,
2012, at 3 (quoting Richard Alfred, chair of Seyfarth Shaw L.L.P.s national wage and hour
litigation practice); Lisa Schreter et al., U.S. Supreme Court Holds Pharmaceutical Sales
Representatives are Exempt Outside Sales Employees and Rebukes DOL’s Efforts to Regulate Via
Amicus Filings, LITTLER, June 20, 2012, http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/ussupreme-court-holds-pharmaceutical-sales-representatives-are-exempt.
284. Compare Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2164 & n.7 (2012)
(noting that the petitioners made $72,000 and $76,000 per year, and that the salaries of
pharmaceutical detailers average in excess of $90,000), with cases cited in notes 272–80 and
accompanying text.
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amicus filings to either aggrandize or abrogate worker protection statutes
caused dramatic swings in the agency’s interpretation of the law. Some of
the Obama DOL’s attempts to restore FLSA interpretations to pre-Bush era
policies were rejected by courts because of the inconsistent agency
positions. For example, in Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels,
LLC,285 the Fifth Circuit refused to defer to the Obama DOL’s position that
employers may not deduct relocation and visa expenses from the wages of
H2-B visa workers if their pay would fall below minimum wage.286 The
DOL’s amicus brief argued that—except for a three-month period at the
end of the Bush administration, which was changed through new written
guidance shortly after President Obama took office—the agency had held
this interpretation for at least fifty years.287 Similarly, some courts
criticized the “gyrating agency letters” on the issue of the compensability
of clothes changing for union workers under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).288 The
Clinton administration had a pro-employee interpretation, the Bush
administration changed it to a pro-industry position, and the Obama
administration returned to a pro-employee interpretation.289
This ping-pong effect is also evident in Henry v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,290
a seven-year litigation saga that was filed while President Bush was in
office but carried on into the Obama administration—with the agency flipflopping on the appropriate interpretation of the administrative exemption
during the life of the case.291
285. 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010).
286. Id. at 404.
287. En Banc Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellees, Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010), (No. 0730942), 2010 WL 3049082, at *24.
288. E.g. Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 216 n.3 (4th Cir. 2009)
(“[O]ur own view rests upon the language of the statute, not upon the gyrating agency letters on the
subject.”).
289. These interpretive shifts occurred for other worker protection statutes as well. For
example, the Bush administration had submitted amicus briefs arguing that employees of
subsidiaries of publicly traded companies are not covered by the whistleblower provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See, e.g., Brief of U.S. Dep’t of Labor, In re Ambrose v. U.S. Foodservice,
Inc., No. 06-096, 2007 WL 7139500 (U.S. Dept. of Labor SAROX Sept. 28, 2007). Several years
later, the Obama DOL submitted amicus briefs to the ARB arguing exactly the opposite: that such
employees are protected by the whistleblower provision. See Brief of the Assistant Secretary of
Labor for Occupational Safety and Health as Amicus Curiae, Johnson v. Siemens Bldg. Tech., Inc.,
273 F. App’x 543 (7th Cir. 2008), (No. 08-032). To overturn the Bush administration view, blessed
by the Supreme Court, that home healthcare workers are not entitled to overtime, the Obama DOL
proposed new regulations that would return to the pre-Bush era agency position that such workers
are non-exempt. Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 76 Fed. Reg.
81,190, 81,201 (proposed Dec. 27, 2011) (providing that all in-home healthcare workers employed
by third parties would be entitled to minimum wage and overtime protection).
290. No. 04-CV-40346, 2009 WL 596232 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
291. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a) (2005); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 614 (6th Cir.
2010) (“The DOL’s position on this issue has changed repeatedly in the last twelve years, indicating
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Quicken Loans concerned whether on-line mortgage bankers fell under
the administrative exemption from overtime.292 At the time the Quicken
Loans litigation commenced, DOL guidance provided that loan officers
were entitled to overtime.293 During the litigation, Quicken Loans’ counsel,
Robert Davis—who had been the Solicitor of Labor under President
George H.W. Bush—requested (in his “separate capacity” as counsel for
the Mortgage Bankers Association) an opinion letter on the question of
whether the administrative exemption from overtime applied to loan
officers.294 In response, the DOL—shifting gears from its prior
interpretations—issued an opinion letter finding that the loan officers
described would be exempt from the FLSA as administrative employees.295
Quicken Loans then used the opinion letter to urge the court to give
deference to the new interpretation under Auer and Long Island Care at
Home and enter summary judgment in its favor.296 The plaintiffs argued
that the court should not give any deference to the new opinion letter
because “it was drafted, negotiated, and obtained by Quicken and its
litigation counsel through their political connections and partnership with
the Mortgage Bankers Association.”297
During the Obama administration, however, the DOL withdrew the
2006 opinion letter and issued a new Administrator’s Interpretation, AI
2010-1, which opined that “the typical job duties of a mortgage loan
officer. . . [did] not qualify as bona fide administrative employees” exempt
from the FLSA.298 The district court—understandably confused by the
that we should not defer to its interpretation.”).
292. Quicken Loans, 2009 WL 596232 at *1.
293. See Letter from Daniel F. Sweeney, Office of Enforcement Policy, Fair Labor Standards
Team, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (May 17, 1999); Letter from Barbara R. Relerford, Office of
Enforcement Policy, Fair Labor Standards Team, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Feb. 16, 2001).
294. Chad Halcom, Labor Department’s About-Face on OT Muddies Quicken Lawsuits,
CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS., July 4, 2010, http://www.workforce.com/article/20100708/NEWS01/
307089999# (reporting that Davis represented both Quicken and the Mortgage Bankers Association
and “obtained the original 2006 labor department opinion in response to a query for the
association”).
295. Opinion Letter, FLSA2006-31 (Sept. 8, 2006), http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/
2006/2006_09_08_31_FLSA.pdf.
296. Report and Recommendation Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Liability (DKT. #432) and Report and Recommendation Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Merits (DKT. #434), 15 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d
(BNA) 1168, at *52 (E.D. Mich. July 16, 2009) (“Defendants now assert in their brief that, because
the web mortgage bankers’ duties are substantially similar to those of the typical mortgage loan
officer hypothesized to the DOL the Court should defer to the DOL’s September 2006 Opinion
Letter and recommend summary judgment in their favor.”).
297. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of Summary Judgment on Liability, Section 259
Good Faith, and Willfulness, Henry v. Quicken Loans, No. 2:04-CV 40346 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 30,
2010).
298. Wage & Hour Division, Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-1, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR
(Mar. 24, 2010), available at
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agency’s interpretive cartwheels—invited the DOL to file an amicus brief
addressing the degree of deference to be given to the new interpretation.299
The DOL argued that its interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations
regarding the administrative exemption was entitled to controlling
deference under Auer.300 Citing Long Island Care at Home, the DOL
argued that “[a]n agency may change its interpretation of its own
regulations, and the interpretation is still entitled to controlling deference,
as long as the agency explains its change in position and the changed
interpretation does not create unfair surprise.”301 The agency argued that AI
2010-1 applied only prospectively, creating no unfair surprise, and
therefore was entitled to deference under Long Island Care at Home.302
On the heels of the DOL’s amicus filing, the American Bankers
Association filed a competing amicus brief arguing that the new
interpretation “marked a sudden and dramatic shift” in the agency’s
position and resulted in unfair surprise to the industry’s employers.303 The
Mortgage Bankers Association then filed a separate suit against the DOL
challenging the Administrator’s Interpretation as a violation of the APA
because it was a rule that should have been promulgated pursuant to
notice-and-comment rulemaking.304 Quicken Loans ultimately prevailed
before the jury.305
The important cautionary tale from Quicken Loans, CastellanosContreras, and the § 203(o) cases described here is the long-term corrosive
impact that dramatic swings in agency amicus positions from
administration to administration will have on three levels: first, respect for
the agency’s technical expertise; second, compliance with informal agency
positions; and third, protection for the statutory beneficiaries of the laws
passed by Congress. As seen in these recent cases involving the DOL as an
amicus, especially in Christopher and Quicken Loans, the DOL’s amicus
http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_1.htm.
299. Brief of Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Henry v. Quicken Loans, 15 Wage & Hour
Cas. 2d (BNA) 1168 (E.D. Mich. 2010), (No. 04-cv-40346).
300. Id. at 13.
301. Id. at 20 (citation omitted).
302. Id. at 26.
303. See Brief of Amici Curiae Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, American Bankers Ass’n, American
Financial Services Ass’n, Consumer Mortgage Coalition, Housing Policy Council, Independent
Community Bankers of America, and Community Mortgage Banking Project Regarding Level of
Deference to be Accorded to Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-1 at 1, Henry v. Quicken
Loans, Inc., 15 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1168 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 04-cv-40346).
304. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n v.
Solis, 864 F. Supp.2d 193 (D.D.C. 2012) (No: 1:11-cv-00073). The MBA’s website has a page
dedicated to its lawsuit. See DOL Overtime Compensation, MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N,
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/DOLOvertimeCompensation.htm (last visted Mar. 14, 2013).
305. Leslie Selig Byrd et al., Quicken Loans Wins Unexpected Overtime Victory, Nat’l L. Rev.,
Mar. 22, 2011, http://www.natlawreview.com/article/quicken-loans-wins-unexpected-overtimevictory.
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position itself—rather than the statutory text passed by Congress—is
becoming the core of the litigation. The next Part analyzes these normative
concerns.
III. LEGAL AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
AGENCY AMICUS STRATEGY
As seen in the analysis of the DOL’s amicus activity relating to one
statute over a span of seven decades, agency amicus briefs can have a
substantial impact on the judicial interpretation of statutes. One’s political
perspective likely influences the assessment of whether such amicus
activity as a tool of policy making on a particular issue is beneficial or
harmful. Employers benefitted from the Bush administration’s approach of
trying to constrict the FLSA’s reach and take a less aggressive approach to
direct enforcement, and expressed outrage at the Obama DOL’s more
zealous advocacy for workers.306 On the other hand, employee advocates
complained about the support for industry during the Bush
administration,307 and applauded the crack down on employers who violate
the FLSA under President Obama.
Even though political fluctuations are to be expected, the more
aggressive amicus strategies of the Bush and Obama administrations have
caused sharp inconsistencies in agency interpretations unlike any other
time in the DOL’s history. This Part explores the benefits and dangers of
the agency amicus strategy and proposes a framework for evaluating
agency amicus briefs.
A. The Benefits and Dangers of the Agency Amicus Strategy
For courts, agency amicus curiae briefs are helpful in sharing the
expertise and experience of the agency in its enforcement of the statutory
scheme passed by Congress. Courts often specifically request agency
amicus participation to help them make sense of complex and technical
laws.308 This is embodied in the Skidmore principle, which invites the
306. For example, the former Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division under Bush, who
issued many of the opinion letters that were used in amicus advocacy on behalf of industry during
the Bush administration, criticized the Obama administration’s enforcement approach as overly
“punitive.” Ironically, she complained that the DOL “does not have an open or transparent process
regarding its decisions to file amicus briefs” and that the DOL “has used amicus briefs to announce
major enforcement policy changes.” Examining Regulatory and Enforcement Actions Under the
Fair Labor Standards Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the H.
Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 112th Cong. 24, 30 (2011) (Statement of Tammy D.
McCutchen, Esq.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg70971/pdf/CHRG112hhrg70971.pdf.
307. See Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor’s Wage War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 375–78
(2008).
308. See Watts, supra note 68, at 1034–35 (noting that the “Supreme Court regularly invited
agencies to file amicus briefs” but lower federal courts rarely do so).
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agency to share its “body of experience and informed judgment” to help
guide courts and litigants.309
Amicus briefs also can be a more flexible, efficient form of advocacy
than direct litigation. Amicus briefs are less costly than affirmative
litigation, which can demand years of agency staff resources, and
rulemaking, which involves expensive and time-consuming notice-andcomment procedures. As an amicus, the DOL can leave the intricacies and
expense of factual development and discovery in the case to the litigants
represented by private counsel, and use its resources to write one brief that
sets forth the agency’s interpretation of ambiguities in the law.
Agency amicus briefs can also promote uniformity in statutory
enforcement. If a recurring systemic issue emerges in FLSA litigation, the
DOL can appear as an amicus in all of the relevant pending cases and point
the courts towards the same result. As Justice Scalia once wrote, deferring
to an agency’s amicus interpretation under Auer “makes the job of a
reviewing court much easier, and since it usually produces affirmance of
the agency’s view without conflict in the Circuits, it imparts (once the
agency has spoken to clarify the regulation) certainty and predictability to
the administrative process.”310 The flexibility of the amicus brief helps to
prevent “ossification” of the law by allowing the agency to adapt its
interpretation to changing circumstances.311
Nevertheless, as seen by the dramatic interpretive swings in the DOL’s
amicus activity from Presidents Bush to Obama, amicus policy making can
result in sharper political fluctuations that are not subjected to public
scrutiny or the compromises inherent in deliberative processes like
rulemaking. Of course, one expects that the political direction of and policy
choices made by administrative agencies will change with the election of a
new President. But the Bush administration’s exploitation of amicus
arguments to change policy to favor regulated industries and withdraw
decades-old DOL interpretations—sometimes in the midst of litigation—
went too far. When the DOL’s work becomes more politically charged, its
credibility as the authoritative voice regarding labor standards is
undermined.
Establishing exemptions from the protections of remedial legislation
through amicus litigation rather than through more transparent, democratic
processes threatens the normative principles of public participation,
reasoned decision making, and accountability underlying our
administrative state.312 Indeed, these were the principles that motivated the
309. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
310. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
311. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247–49 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that restricting Chevron’s scope will ossify statutory law).
312. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996) (noting that APA notice
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Chevron Court to defer to the agency’s resolution—through rulemaking—
of the clash of opposing interests. “[T]he agency considered the matter in a
detailed and reasoned fashion.”313 The political choice to narrow the scope
of the statute was accomplished through a formal public process, not a
covert amicus litigation strategy. Thus, Chevron respected the political
choices made by the agency during the administrative lawmaking process,
but it did not undermine the obligation of the courts to test agency
decisions for reasonableness and procedural integrity.
Blind deference to an agency amicus interpretation under Auer
contradicts the fundamental principle of separation of powers. Deferring to
an agency’s interpretation of its own vague regulations concentrates the
lawmaking, enforcement, and review functions in one branch. The
concentration of so much power in the hands of the agency is especially
dangerous when abused to favor regulated industries rather than statutorily
protected groups, undermining the remedial intent of Congress. Even
Justice Scalia, the author of Auer and a sometimes ardent proponent of
Chevron deference,314 has recognized the separation of powers problems
implicated by Auer:
[W]hile I have in the past uncritically accepted [Auer], I have
become increasingly doubtful of its validity. On the surface, it
seems to be a natural corollary—indeed, an a fortiori
application—of the rule that we will defer to an agency’s
interpretation of the statute it is charged with implementing.
But it is not. When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that
it commits to the implementation of an executive agency, it
has no control over that implementation (except, of course,
through further, more precise, legislation). The legislative and
executive functions are not combined. But when an agency
promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the
implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination
of the rule’s meaning. And though the adoption of a rule is an
exercise of the executive rather than the legislative power, a
properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It seems
contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to
permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as

and comment procedures are “designed to assure due deliberation”).
313. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
314. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 521. As other scholars have noted, Chevron has been a “Magna Carta” promoted by
conservatives “to deregulate and to demand judicial acquiescence.” Eskridge & Baer, supra note 14,
at 1087; see also Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283, 284, 312 (1986).
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well.315
As seen in the DOL’s interpretive shifts under Presidents Bush and
Obama, Auer prompted an amicus approach to policy making that
permitted immediate, inconsistent interpretive shifts with each
administration. Over time, this will undermine public confidence in the
agency’s expertise and respect for the law. Agencies will be viewed as
political puppets, captured by the interests groups that favor the President
in power, rather than technical legal experts and career public servants
faithfully executing congressional intent on behalf of statutory
beneficiaries. When the interpretation of a remedial statute becomes a
political football, courts are left confused rather than educated about the
proper construction of the statute. And the ultimate losers will be the
workers whom Congress aimed to protect with the FLSA.
That is not to say that the agency should refrain from filing amicus
briefs in private litigation. As the agency entrusted by Congress with the
power to enforce labor standards, it should not simply sit on the sidelines
while systemic legal issues emerge in the courts. If the DOL exercises its
amicus power in harmony with the remedial purpose of the FLSA, the
agency can be a critical, effective voice on behalf of the workers who are
protected by the FLSA.
B. A Proposed Analytical Framework for Agency Amicus Briefs
The doctrinal melee over the proper weight that reviewing courts
should afford to arguments in agency amicus briefs results in part from the
lack of recognition that agencies sometimes use affirmative amicus
litigation strategies to mold the law—much like an interest group would—
not simply to share their expertise with the court. This Article has named
and examined the agency amicus strategy of policy making as it relates to
the FLSA, under which government amicus advocacy has been prolific and
important. The analysis offers several guiding principles for agency amicus
activity.
First, agencies should define and make publicly available on their
websites their amicus policy and strategy. This policy should include the
process by which potential amicus participation will be evaluated, the
enforcement priority areas and emerging legal issues on which the agency
will focus, and how that strategy comports with the enabling remedial
statute with which Congress has entrusted it to enforce. Articulating the
agency’s amicus priorities would enhance the transparency of the agency’s
amicus decision making process and provide guidance to litigants. It would
also help prevent any “unfair surprise” to industry, as discussed in
Christopher.
315. Talk Am. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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Second, one consistent thread woven into the Supreme Court’s
decisions involving DOL amicus briefs from Skidmore through
Christopher is that informal agency interpretations announced for the first
time in an amicus brief should be scrutinized more carefully by courts to
ensure compatibility with the statutory text. Mead and other cases have
carved out another type of implied delegated authority for which a greater
level of deference may be appropriate, in the absence of formal
processes.316 In the case of the FLSA or other remedial statutes, a long and
consistent interpretation of the statute (as held in Kasten)317 should be
entitled to greater weight. Thus, amicus briefs that describe how the
agency’s prior positions and interpretations apply to the facts before the
court—as the DOL’s amicus briefs did in Skidmore and Auer—should
likewise be afforded a higher degree of weight and respect.318
For all other types of informal agency interpretations and amicus
arguments, the Skidmore rubric should apply. Although a vaguer standard,
Skidmore requires that the court test agency amicus positions against the
remedial purposes of the FLSA and other indicators of persuasiveness.
This has included, “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency,
formality, and relative expertness.”319 If the key authority on which the
agency relies is a recently-adopted opinion letter or “advisory
memorandum”—especially if issued in response to an adverse judicial
decision or requested by a regulated industry group—the court should not
give the interpretation any deference at all. If the argument is announced
for the first time in the amicus brief itself, the argument should be
scrutinized more carefully to ensure compliance with remedial statutory
purpose and to control for litigating positions and political overreaching.320
Of course, as administrative law scholars have recognized, clarifying
the appropriate level of deference to give to an agency’s interpretation may
perhaps be a mere academic enterprise.321 As the empirical analysis in this
316. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230–31.
317. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335–36
(2011).
318. In addition to Kasten, the DOL’s brief in Skidmore, which described the agency’s prior
enforcement activity that found waiting time compensable in other employment contexts, is an
example. Brief on Behalf of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States
Department of Labor, as Amicus Curiae at 6, Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), 1944
WL 42828, at *6–7.
319. 533 U.S. at 228 (footnotes omitted).
320. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212–13 (1988) (rejecting interpretation
advanced for the first time in a litigation brief).
321. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions
Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 98 (2011) (arguing that studies about judicial review of agency
action suggest that scholars “should spend less time engaging in debates about the alleged
differences among the remarkably similar judicial review doctrines and about the circumstances in
which each should be applied” and “focus instead on the three common elements of the doctrines:
consistency with applicable statutes, consistency with available evidence, and quality of agency
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Article shows, most courts rule in a manner consistent with the agency’s
interpretation, typically without defining the appropriate deference
standard or referring to the agency’s arguments at all. Other scholars have
found that judges—especially Supreme Court Justices—are likely to rule
based on their ideological preferences rather than dutifully sort through the
texts of statutes and regulations to divine legislative intent.322 In a study of
workplace law cases, however, Professors James Brudney and Corey
Ditslear found that the Justices’ reliance on legislative history to review
agency action led to less politicized results, at least among the more liberal
members of the Court.323
Despite its mushiness, Skidmore’s instruction that courts test any
amicus position for “the power to persuade” provides the most respect for
separation of powers, and congressional will in particular. A key
component of Skidmore review, lacking in the Christopher majority
opinion, must be whether the agency’s interpretation comports with the
“remedial and humanitarian purpose” of the law. This is more critical in
the context of workplace laws and other remedial statutes designed to
protect a less advantaged or powerful group (like lower-wage workers)
from a more powerful group.324 This purpose pulls strongly in favor of
interpreting statutory coverage expansively and exemptions from the law
narrowly.325 Consistent with the principle of separation of powers, courts
should err on the side of favoring agency interpretations that reinforce
Congress’s goal of worker protection and be highly skeptical of agency
positions that undermine it.
This framework does not mean that all pro-employee amicus
interpretations offered by the DOL must be accepted automatically by the
courts. If the agency is urging a new interpretation that is not supported by
prior agency interpretations or positions, courts should apply Skidmore—
not Auer deference—and independently examine and interpret the FLSA’s
statutory text. Both the majority and dissent in Christopher followed this
approach. But the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs were exempt had
reasoning.”); Raso & Eskridge, supra note 14, at 1817 (finding that “Justices apply deference
doctrine inconsistently, responding to their ideological preferences, the policies underlying the
major deference regimes, and the preferences of Congress and the President”).
322. Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 DUKE L.J.
2193, 2193–30 (2009) (discussing studies that found “highly politicized” voting patterns in judicial
review of agency action).
323. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 173 (2008).
324. The analysis may be different with less protective legislation, like criminal or immigration
law, but should apply in other contexts involving in which Congress designed the law to protect a
vulnerable or exploited group, such as consumers.
325. Tenn. Coal, 321 U.S. at 597; see also A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493
(1945) (“To extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and
spirit is to abuse the interpretive process and to frustrate the announced will of the people.”).
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to skirt around the well-established principle that courts should err on
reading FLSA coverage broadly and exemptions strictly. The majority
opinion reflected more concern for the potential “massive liability” on the
pharmaceutical industry than for the overtime rights of the plaintiffs.326
Such public policy concerns about the costs of compliance should be
weighed by Congress, not the judiciary.
Indeed, the Supreme Court understood this important distinction in the
early days of the FLSA. Just a year after Skidmore, the Court rejected a
DOL interpretation, developed under pressure from the coal mining
industry, that miners were not entitled to compensation for the time spent
travelling in underground mines.327 Finding such travel time compensable
would have imposed massive liability on the coal mining industry, which
led to a compromise between the mining industry and labor unions that it
could be excluded. The Court found that argument “legally untenable”
under the FLSA and therefore unworthy of respect.328 Jewell Ridge
ultimately prompted Congress to pass the Portal-to-Portal Act to limit the
compensability of travel time and de minimus time.329 But it was the
province of the legislature—not the judiciary or the executive—to amend
the statute to narrow its coverage. As eloquently stated by the Court in
Tennessee Coal: “We are not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of
trade but with the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full
measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others.”330
Courts should heed the early lessons offered by Skidmore and Jewell
Ridge. To the extent that the agency is articulating an amicus argument—
unsupported by rulemaking or prior agency interpretations—on behalf of a
regulated entity rather than an individual falling within the statute’s
protection, it should not be entitled to any deference or respect. Decisions
to exempt regulated parties from remedial statutes should occur only
through notice-and-comment rulemaking or democratic processes, not
furtive litigation strategies or amicus briefs. To the extent this may ossify
or bolster fair labor standards, it is a burden that regulated entities, not
statutory beneficiaries, should bear.
If this standard had been applied in Long Island Care at Home and
other cases in which the Bush DOL used amicus briefs to overturn proemployee interpretations and elevate the interests of the regulated, the
result in these cases may have been different. Chevron and Auer, however,
allowed the Bush administration to hide behind a judicial presumption that
the agency was enforcing the underlying purposes of the FLSA, while it
systematically dismantled worker protections that had been built over
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012).
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 170 (1945).
Id. at 169.
Portal to Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, § 4, 61 Stat. 84.
Tenn. Coal, 321 U.S. at 597.
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many decades. Courts should not permit agencies to use the powerful
sword of amicus filings, sheathed under the guise of deference doctrine, to
inflict such violence on the remedial goals of Congress.
CONCLUSION
As seen in the example of amicus activity in wage and hour cases, the
DOL has used amicus strategies to emasculate and aggrandize its statutory
mandate. Agency amicus briefs typically provide valuable interpretive
guidance to courts about the statutory scheme under consideration. But
they also risk improper manipulation in ways that undermine democratic
lawmaking values and separation of powers. Although agency
interpretations advanced for the first time in amicus briefs may be entitled
to respect under Skidmore, they rarely qualify for Chevron deference.
Regardless of the purported deference regime argued, however, courts
tend to rule consistently with the position advanced in agency amicus
briefs. On the whole, this is desirable, so long as the agency is offering its
expertise in a way that remains faithful to the public policy purpose
established by Congress in the underlying statute. The powerful, stealth
influence that agency amicus curiae briefs can have on courts requires that
judges be more mindful of their responsibility to test agency interpretations
against the remedial purposes of worker protection laws and the
democratic values of transparency, public accountability, and reasoned
decision making.
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Appendix
Amicus Curiae Briefs Submitted by the U.S. Department of Labor
in Fair Labor Standards Act Cases by Presidential Administration
Roosevelt
10 East 40th St. Bldg. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945)
149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199 (1947)
Acme Lumber Co. v. Shaw, 10 So.2d 285 (Ala. 1942)
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., 322 U.S. 607 (1944)
Allesandro v. C.F. Smith Co., 136 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1943)
Anderson v. Manhattan Lighterage Corp., 148 F.2d 971
(2d Cir. 1945)
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946)
Armour & Co v. Carpenter, 141 P.2d 797 (Okla. 1943)
Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944)
Atlantic Co. v. Broughton, 146 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1944)
Basik v. Gen. Motors Corp, 19 N.W.2d 142 (Mich. 1945)
Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679 (1945)
Borella v. Borden Co., 145 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1944)
Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1941)
Bracey v. Luray, 138 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1943)
Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945)
Brown v. Bailey, 147 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1941)
Bumpus v. Cont’l Baking Co., 124 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1941)
Burton v. Zimmerman, 131 F.2d 377 (4th Cir. 1942)
Castaing v. P.R. Am. Sugar Refinery, 145 F.2d 403 (1st Cir. 1944)
Chapman v. Home Ice Co. of Memphis, 136 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1943)
Colbeck v. Dairyland Creamery, 17 N.W.2d 262 (S.D. 1945)
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